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Record W173673326 · doi:10.7202/1044605ar

Friendship and the Grounds of Reasons

2018· article· en· W173673326 on OpenAlexvenueno aff
Diane Jeske

Bibliographic record

VenueLes ateliers de l éthique · 2018
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldArts and Humanities
TopicPhilosophical Ethics and Theory
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsFriendshipPrideMoralitySocial psychologyPerspective (graphical)DeliberationMoral disengagementFocus (optics)PsychologySocial cognitive theory of moralityEpistemologySociologyPolitical sciencePhilosophyLawComputer sciencePolitics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Friendship and other intimate relationships have created difficulties for moral philosophers. While morality seems to require us to remain impartial between persons, friendship seems to generate demands or obligations of partiality toward our intimates. But the difficulty can be removed once we cease to focus on categorizing reasons as moral or non-moral. This tendency to divide reasons into categories of moral vs. non-moral leads us to give those that we label ‘moral’ pride of place and to assume that the category must be uniform. If we abandon these assumptions, then reasons of intimacy or friendship will no longer be so puzzling. We will then be able to see that all reasons, in the end, are importantly egocentric, and that deliberation must always proceed from an egocentric perspective.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesScience and technology studies
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.841
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.003
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.029
GPT teacher head0.242
Teacher spread0.213 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations2
Published2018
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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