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Record W1818952397 · doi:10.1111/ecin.12193

EUCLIDEAN FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY

2015· article· en· W1818952397 on OpenAlexaboutno aff
Gabriele Gratton, Anton Kolotilin

Bibliographic record

VenueEconomic Inquiry · 2015
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicEconomic theories and models
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsPtolemy's table of chordsFair divisionVirtueHeavenJudaismQuarter (Canadian coin)Euclidean geometryHistorySociologyPhilosophyLawClassicsMathematical economicsMathematicsTheologyPolitical scienceArchaeology

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

The inherent vice of capitalism is the unequal sharing of blessings. The inherent virtue of Socialism is the equal sharing of miseries. —Winston Churchill Fairness and efficiency are often irreconcilable. The ancients knew it all too well, as shown by Solomon's fair division of the baby. Economists have long been repeating this. Indeed, one scholar, despite reading this article twice, still did not find anything in it to be surprising, curious, or funny.1 Yet, this basic fact of life is still unclear to many a wise man. Ptolemy's Dilemma. The problem we are supposing may be most completely given in the form of the one that is said to have haunted Ptolemy I, King of Egypt. He wished to construct his Temple of the Muses (the famous Library) in the city of Alexandria. Alexandria had three neighborhoods along its coast: Rhakotis, the Jewish Quarter, and the Port, as shown by the map in Figure 1. The inhabitants of each neighborhood wished the Temple to be built in their respective neighborhood. When Ptolemy summoned the wisest men of Egypt, they presented a fair solution: the Temple shall be built equally close to each neighborhood. It is at that time that Euclid presented the King with the manuscript we report below. It showed the King the location of the fair temple: a swamp, ten miles outside of Alexandria. Not surprisingly, for those familiar with mathematical works of that age, the manuscript is dry. The figure therein has no obvious description or axes, perhaps because a Cartesian coordinate system was invented 19 centuries after Euclid's work. The results in the manuscript are merely stated, with no intuition, no motivation, no technical footnotes, and no reference to empirical stylized facts. Previous literature is completely ignored too (though we argue this might be somewhat excusable). As a result, its implications might not be so apparent to our modern minds. “Ptolemy [himself] once asked [Euclid] if there was in geometry a way shorter than that of the elements; he replied that there was no royal road to geometry.”2 Three individuals have bliss policies A, B, and C that form a triangle. DEFINITION 1.(Fairness) A policy F is fair if AF, BF, and CF are equal. DEFINITION 2.(Efficiency) A policy E is efficient if it falls within the triangle ABC. Notions of fairness and efficiency coincide with utility equality and Pareto efficiency if individual preferences are represented by Euclidean loss functions. PROPOSITION 1.The fair policy is the center of the circle that circumscribes the triangle ABC. Proof.Follows from the definition of fairness and Euclid's Elements, Book IV, Proposition 5, about a given triangle to circumscribe a circle. ■ PROPOSITION 2.The fair policy is efficient if and only if the triangle ABC is acute-angled. Proof.Follows from the definition of efficiency and Euclid's Elements, Book IV, Proposition 5, Porism, that, when the center of the circle falls within the triangle, the angle ABC is less than a right angle; and when the center of the circle falls outside the triangle, the angle ABC is greater than a right angle. ■ Porism.From this it is manifest that policies that are fair are not efficient in an aligned society (ABC is obtuse-angled). ■ Utility equality (what the manuscript refers to as fairness) is obtained with any policy p such that u(p, bA) = u(p, bB) = u(p, bC). Similarly, Pareto efficiency is obtained with any policy p that is a convex combination of bA, bB, and bC. The manuscript uses a single theorem by Euclid to (1) characterize the (generically) unique fair policy and (2) determine necessary and sufficient conditions for the fair policy to be Pareto efficient. The last porism in the manuscript suggests a further interpretation of Euclid's results: fairness is never efficient when the society is aligned in the sense that the agents disagree primarily along one out of two political dimensions. For example, let one dimension be economic issues and the other social issues. A society with heterogeneous social preferences and little economic disparity is aligned. A society with heterogeneous social preferences and great economic disparity is misaligned. The first would find it difficult to implement a policy that is both fair and efficient; the second would find it easy.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.004
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.011
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.013
Threshold uncertainty score0.044

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0040.011
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0020.002
Science and technology studies0.0030.007
Scholarly communication0.0060.005
Open science0.0010.003
Research integrity0.0020.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0130.002

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.097
GPT teacher head0.251
Teacher spread0.153 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

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Citations2
Published2015
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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