Bibliographic record
Abstract
At the beginning of 1935, British strategic foreign policy was changing. While the British had not yet abandoned either arms limitation or the League, the events of the next six months demonstrated that these were uncertain instruments. This was especially so because Japan and Germany were now absent from Geneva. Thus, the British were forced to experiment with other ways of protecting their interests in the uncertain ‘period of deterrence’. Here, Soviet Russia played an important, if awkward role. This was due to a clash of sensibilities. Soviet Russia sought security by means of alliances. If necessary, these alliances could be covered by the cloak of collective security, but Moscow's real goal was the promise of military support, something evident in the Eastern Locarno talks. This ran counter to the British desire to manage and control Germany's rearmament, since Berlin not only was unwilling to enter the Eastern Locarno agreements, but also was using them to fend off calls for arms limitation. Any Franco-Soviet agreement was potentially both antithetical to working through the League and dangerous to Britain if its Locarno commitments were increased. However, while castigating the Soviets for a return to pre-1914 methods, the British themselves also stepped outside the realm of collective action, signing the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in 1935. With Germany squared, the British still had to deal with Japan, a task made difficult because the collapse of naval arms limitation talks in December 1934 had resulted from Tokyo's intransigence over naval issues.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.007 | 0.005 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.006 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.020 | 0.004 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".