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Bibliographic record
Abstract
In the wiretap model of secure communication, Alice is connected to Bob over a noisy channel that is eavesdropped by Eve. The goal is to provide (asymptotic) reliability and perfect secrecy assuming that the Eve has unlimited computational power. The model has attracted considerable attention in recent years because it provides a natural model for passive eavesdropping in wireless communication. We consider a wiretap model with active adversaries, and define adversarial wiretap (AWTP) channels using a (ρ <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">r</sub> , ρ <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">w</sub> ) wiretap adversary who can read a fraction ρ <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">r</sub> , and modify a fraction ρ <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">w</sub> of a sent codeword. The code components that are read and/or modified can be chosen adaptively, and the subsets of read and modified components could be different. AWTP codes provide secrecy and reliability for communication over AWTP channels. We define the security and reliability of AWTP channels and use these definitions to evaluate the security and reliability of codes for these channels. This paper has two main contributions. First, we prove an upper bound on the rate of AWTP codes for (ρ <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">r</sub> , ρ <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">w</sub> )-AWTP channels. Second, we give an explicit construction of a perfectly secure AWTP code family with efficient decoding that achieves the bound and, hence, obtain the secrecy capacity of AWTP channels for large alphabets. AWTP model is a natural extension of Wyner's wiretap models, and somewhat surprisingly, it is also closely related to a seemingly unrelated cryptographic primitive, secure message transmission (SMT). This relation results in a new (and the only known) bound on the transmission rate of 1-round (ε, δ)-SMT protocols. We discuss our results, give their relations to other works, and propose directions for future work.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it