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Record W1969699379 · doi:10.1142/s0219198903000957

When will the Range of Prizes in Tournaments Increase in the Noise or in the Number of Players?

2003· article· en· W1969699379 on OpenAlex
Yigal Gerchak, Qi‐Ming He

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueInternational Game Theory Review · 2003
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicEconomic theories and models
Canadian institutionsDalhousie University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsIntuitionGeneralityTournamentMultiplicative functionMathematical economicsRange (aeronautics)MathematicsMultiplicative noiseEconomicsEconometricsComputer scienceCombinatoricsMathematical analysisPsychologyTelecommunications

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

The symmetric equilibrium resulting from the celebrated Tournament model of Lazear and Rosen has a range of compensation between winner and loser which is inversely proportional to E[f(X)], the expectation of the additive noise's density. There seems to be a belief that this functional is always increasing in the noise's variability, which would agree with economic intuition — when output is noisier it should be less worthwhile to work hard. We show that such is not the case for some distributions, and characterize classes where such is or is not the case. When the number of players n grows, winning is more difficult so we would expect the required range of compensation to be larger. That would require that E[f(Y)], where Y = max (X 1 ,…,X n-1 ), will decrease in n. We examine the generality of this property. Finally we explore the same issues within a multiplicative model.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.005
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.133
Threshold uncertainty score0.999

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0050.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0020.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.041
GPT teacher head0.280
Teacher spread0.239 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it