Bibliographic record
Abstract
Few events have imparted more obvious lesson to future generations than loyalty of 1891. For century it served as cautionary tale of what became of politicians foolhardy enough to pursue free trade with United States. Wilfrid Laurier's Liberals campaigned on bold new platform of unrestricted reciprocity, while Sir John A. Macdonald's Conservatives stood their national policy which, since 1879, had protected domestic industry applying high tariffs against foreign imports. Macdonald successfully framed campaign as struggle for survival of Canada, accusing Liberals of veiled treason and wrapping himself patriotically in Union Jack. A British subject I was bom, Sir John A. declared. A British subject I will die.1 It was last refuge of scoundrel, but it worked. The British connection triumphed, Tories won election, and when Macdonald passed away three months later, legend was born that he had literally died saving country from annexation to United States.It seemed clear enough at time that Canadians would never vote for free trade, and lesson learned in 1891 was reinforced election of 1911, when Liberals - this time governing party - again proposed unrestricted reciprocity, and again went down to defeat. Not for three quarters of century would issue be raised again in federal election, even as Canada and United States steadily grew closer economically. When old battle was finally fought again in election of 1988, Brian Mulrone/s Progressive Conservatives earned mandate to implement historic Canada-US free trade agreement. Today, issue has been definitively settled, and gone is time when a British subject I will die was meaningful rallying cry for Canadians. This being case, does election of 1891 have any lessons of history left to teach us?The answer is yes, but not for reasons one might expect. First, close inspection of campaign reveals that Canadians ofthat era were not quite so pro-British and anti- American as its outcome suggests. Almost half of voters backed free trade, and many were motivated continentalist brand of nationalism that maintained that Canadians could compete successfully against Americans under free trade without compromising their economic or political independence. Second, for all apocalyptic talk of Canada being sold out to United States - recurring theme in Canadian- American relations to be sure - preponderance of historical evidence suggests that despite some indiscretions and foolishness on part ofa few of Liberals, intentions of party were no less patriotic than those of Conservatives. Finally, contrary to impression created Macdonald, there never was sinister American conspiracy to acquire Canada, by force, fraud, or both in late 19th century.2 In fact US diplomacy was quite proper in its handling of Canadian question in 1891, showing patience and restraint even in face of ugly anti-American rhetoric from Macdonald government.THE CONFIDENT CONTINENTALISTSTo understand true extent of anti-American sentiment in Canada during election of 1891, it is first necessary to get past iconic Tory propaganda that produced most enduring images from campaign. There is the old flag, old policy, older leader poster, an unabashed appeal to British-Canadian sentiment, which depicts flag-waving Sir John A. perched on shoulders of his supporters. There is cartoon that shows Laurier and Sir Richard Cartwright (Laurier's English-Canadian lieutenant) begging on their knees for free trade from their American masters, and another that imagines Cartwright as slave trader, selling bound Miss Canada to devilish Uncle Sam.3 Macdonald's accusation that dark American conspiracy to annex Canada was afoot and his great ringing phrases - veiled treason and a British subject I will die - are better remembered than anything that Liberals uttered during campaign. …
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.006 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.017 | 0.017 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.008 | 0.007 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.006 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.010 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.040 | 0.012 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".