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Record W1976576894 · doi:10.1177/0008429811430054

Kinds, Classes, and Clumps: A Preliminary Typology of Concepts and some Implications for the Study of Religions

2012· article· en· W1976576894 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

venuePublished in a venue whose home country is Canada.
no affNo Canadian affiliation: this work is invisible to an affiliation-only frame.
No Canadian affiliation. An affiliation-only frame, the usual design, would never have seen this work. It is one of the works that make the case for inverting the frame.

Bibliographic record

VenueStudies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses · 2012
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldArts and Humanities
TopicStudy and Philosophy of Religion
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsTypologyInferenceEpistemologyRedressClass (philosophy)SociologyProperty (philosophy)PhilosophyLaw

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Much mischief has been done in thinking about religion by a general failure to attend to the different kinds of concepts that the brain employs and the capabilities of each kind. The general assumption seems to have been instead that concepts are, or should be, all of the same kind. This paper attempts to redress that failure by offering a preliminary typology of concepts. It identifies three types: kinds, classes, and clumps, defined in terms of ‘essences’ (generative mechanisms), features, and (generally unbounded) sets of instances, respectively. It also points to degree of inferentiality as a property of these types that can be especially useful for thinking about religion, kinds being inference-rich, classes inference-fixed, and clumps inference-indeterminate. Although careful reflection at times transforms clumps into kinds or classes, it can also lead to the recognition that a putative kind or class may be better considered a clump. An example of the latter—hardly the only one—may be the term ‘religion.’ It is neither necessary nor possible for careful reflection entirely to abandon clump concepts for kinds and classes. Scholars do, however, need to exercise care in what they use each type of concept to try to do. Bien des erreurs ont été commises à propos de la religion à cause d’une incapacité générale à s’attacher aux différentes sortes de concepts que le cerveau utilise et les capacités de chacune. Il semble que la supposition générale ait été que tous les concepts doivent être de la même sorte. Cet article cherche à remédier à cette incapacité en offrant une typologie préliminaire des concepts. Il identifie trois sortes : les types, les classes et les agrégats, définis respectivement en termes d’ ‘essences’ (mécanismes génératifs), de traits et de séries de cas (généralement illimités). L’article nous amène également à envisager le degré d’ ‘inférentialité’ comme propriété de chacune de ces différentes sortes qui nous permettent de penser la religion : les types étant ainsi riches en ‘inférentialité’, les classes ayant une ‘inférentialité’ fixe, tandis que l’ ‘inférentialité’ des agrégats demeure indéterminée. Bien qu’une attention méticuleuse puisse à certains moments transformer les agrégats en types ou en classes, elle peut aussi nous amener à reconnaître qu’un type ou une classe supposée pourrait être considérée plutôt comme un agrégat. Un exemple de ce dernier cas de figure —loin d’être isolé— pourrait être le terme de ‘religion’. Il n’est pas nécessaire ni possible dans une réflexion soutenue d’abandonner le concept d’agrégat au profit des types ou des classes. Il est cependant nécessaire de porter une attention soutenue à la façon dont chaque concept est utilisé et à ce qui en est fait.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesScience and technology studies
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.498
Threshold uncertainty score0.999

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0010.004
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.175
GPT teacher head0.406
Teacher spread0.231 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it