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Record W1981745779 · doi:10.1002/hec.630

The effect of variable health insurance deductibles on the demand for physician visits

2001· article· en· W1981745779 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueHealth Economics · 2001
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicHealthcare Policy and Management
Canadian institutionsMcMaster University
FundersCanton de Genève
KeywordsDeductibleEndogeneityActuarial scienceHealth insuranceIncentiveBusinessInstrumental variableHealth careOrder (exchange)Control (management)Generalized method of momentsEconomicsEconometricsMicroeconomicsFinancePanel data

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In order to contain cost in the health care sector, the introduction of consumer incentives in health insurance has been suggested and realized in many countries. The Swiss health system reform of 1996 introduced a choice of deductible for health services in the mandatory basic health insurance. This paper estimates the effect of this choice on physician service utilization. A generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator is applied to take account of the endogeneity of the choice of the deductible in the estimation of the number of physician visits. This paper finds that most of the observed reduction in the number of physician visits among individuals who choose a higher deductible seems to be a result of self-selection of individuals into the respective insurance contracts, and not to induced changes in utilization behaviour.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.004
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.929
Threshold uncertainty score0.572

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0040.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.045
GPT teacher head0.292
Teacher spread0.248 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it