Independent foundations, public money and public accountability: Whither ministerial responsibility as democratic governance?
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract: Over the past decade the federal government has established a number of independent foundations to spend public money on public business. The democratic control that is meant to obtain under the Constitution is not present in the design of these foundations. This article examines the ways in which their organizational design is contrary to the principles of responsible government as well as to the government's own policy on so‐called alternative service‐delivery structures. The article also discusses how the designers of these foundations relied primarily on results‐based reporting instead of the traditional system of ministerial responsibility. The author concludes that these organizational designs are beyond the pale of the Constitution's requirements for democratic control over public administration and suggests measures that may correct these deficiences. Sommaire: Au cours de la demière décennie, le gouvernement fédéeral a mis sur pied un certain nombre de fondations indépendantes visant à consacrer des fonds publics aux affaires publiques. Ces fondations ne comportent pas dans leur conception le contrôle démocratique prévu par la Constitution. Le présent article examine comment leur conception organisationnelle va à l'encontre des principes de gouvemement responsable ainsi que la politique même du gouvernement sur ce qu'on appelle les modes altematifs de prestation de services. L'article examine également la manière dont les concepteurs de ces fondations se sont fiés essentiellement à la reddition de comptes axés sur les résultats plutôt qu'au système traditionnel de respon‐sabilité ministérielle. L'auteur conclut que ces conceptions organisationnelles ne repondent pas aux exigences de la Constitution pour ce qui est du contrôle démocratique de l'administration publique et propose des mesures qui pourraient pallier à ces insuffisances.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.014 | 0.022 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.006 | 0.032 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.015 | 0.012 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.008 |
| Research integrity | 0.005 | 0.006 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.004 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".