MétaCan
Menu
Back to cohort
Record W1991894089 · doi:10.1109/tciaig.2011.2160994

A Robust Learning Approach to Repeated Auctions With Monitoring and Entry Fees

2011· article· en· W1991894089 on OpenAlex
Amir Danak, Shie Mannor

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueIEEE Transactions on Computational Intelligence and AI in Games · 2011
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsMcGill University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsBiddingCommon value auctionRobustness (evolution)Computer scienceReal-time biddingEbiddingSimple (philosophy)Combinatorial auctionMathematical optimizationOperations researchMicroeconomicsEconomicsMathematics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In this paper, we present a strategic bidding framework for repeated auctions with monitoring and entry fees. We motivate and formally define the desired properties of our framework and present a recursive bidding algorithm, according to which buyers learn to avoid submitting bids in stages where they have a relatively low chance of winning the auctioned item. The proposed bidding strategies are computationally simple as players do not need to recompute the sequential strategies from the data collected to date. Pursuing the proposed efficient bidding (EB) algorithm, players monitor their relative performance in the course of the game and submit their bids based on their current estimate of the market condition. We prove the stability and robustness of the proposed strategies and show that they dominate myopic and random bidding strategies using an experiment in search engine marketing.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: Simulation or modeling
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.828
Threshold uncertainty score0.454

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.150
GPT teacher head0.340
Teacher spread0.189 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it