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Record W1992317385 · doi:10.1145/860575.860726

Coalition formation with non-transferable payoff for group buying

2003· article· en· W1992317385 on OpenAlexaff
Frederick Asselin, Brahim Chaib-draa

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversité Laval
Fundersnot available
KeywordsPartition (number theory)Stochastic gameTransferable utilityPareto optimalPareto principleGroup (periodic table)Group buyingDomain (mathematical analysis)Mathematical economicsSet (abstract data type)Computer scienceMathematical optimizationSoftwarePareto efficiencyCore (optical fiber)Game theoryMathematicsMulti-objective optimizationCombinatorics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Group buying is a natural application domain for research on coalition formation. Finding a Pareto-optimal partition (no other partition gives more to a consumer without giving less to another one) of the set of consumers in buying groups is equivalent to the generation of exact set covers known to be NP-hard [1]. Since humans have difficulties in finding Pareto-optimal deals in reasonably complex situations, the use of software agents is justified. In this short paper, an investigation on the computational and economic performances of software agents in non-transferable payoff coalition formation (the general and less studied case) applied to group buying is conducted.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.013
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.004
Threshold uncertainty score0.013

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.013
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.002
Scholarly communication0.0010.003
Open science0.0020.002
Research integrity0.0010.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0040.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.093
GPT teacher head0.364
Teacher spread0.271 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations3
Published2003
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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