The Cuban Embargo: The Domestic Politics of an American Foreign Policy

For those amazed at the confusion that has driven U.S.-Cuban relations since 1959, this book is an excellent primer. In it the authors trace the domestic political factors responsible for the evolution of U.S. policy toward revolutionary Cuba. In particular they have helped to debunk the myth that Washington has been held hostage to a formidable Cuban-American lobby and indeed have illustrated well that official policy has been the object of a number of complex “push” and “pull” factors over several decades — a process that they outline with clarity. Also of interest is an analysis of various facets of the embargo itself — from trade to travel, investment to immigration, remittances to cultural and sports exchanges. In sum, the embargo of Cuba is thus no monolith, and the authors show that there has been a varying degree of commitment to it by various administrations.Here, laid out in chronological order, supported clearly by pertinent documentation, is an analysis of a set of extremely complex factors that have all sought to bring their influence to bear upon government policy for 47 years. It is also clear that, in no small degree because of that domestic pressure, Washington has “moved the goalposts” several times in its relationship with Havana — making it clear that improving bilateral ties could only happen after Cuba first stopped being a satellite of the Soviet Union, and then stopped supporting Soviet expansionism in Central America, and finally withdrew from Angola. Although Cuba eventually took all these steps, Washington continued to maintain a hostile attitude.This is due largely to the political clout of those for whom the cold war never really ended — at least as far as Cuba is concerned. The apex of their power came in the 1980s, when President Reagan encouraged the formation of the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF). Reagan saw Cuba as a security threat, a belief skillfully exploited by the CANF leadership, and a symbiotic relationship resulted. Examining this relationship — involving the executive, Congress, various PACS, government agencies, and international organizations — the authors show how CANF sought to harmonize agendas around the core issue of pressuring the Cuban government. The end result was a special interest group that lobbied with tremendous success on Capitol Hill and at the very least was an extremely strong influence on U.S. policy.It is important, however, not to lose sight of the broader context of domestic political influence. In this regard, it is instructive to note the new actors now exercising their political clout in the formulation of U.S. policy toward Cuba. Of key importance is a nucleus of Cuban American politicians whose political star rose after Ileana Ros-Lehtinen was elected to the House of Representatives in 1989. Cuba policy — under Republicans and Democrats alike — has thus been driven largely by domestic political influences: generous PAC donations, CANF, Cuban American politicians, the office of the president, and Capitol Hill. One of the book’s strengths is its evaluation of the passionate struggles between members of the House and the Senate, the strategies used by advocates of both positions on the embargo, and the concessions made. The authors document the shift of power over the “Cuba question” to “assertive policy entrepreneurs in Congress” (p. 109), seen clearly in the 1996 passage of the Helms-Burton legislation. To a large extent, however, the significant influence of the Cuban American community has diminished since the Elián González case in 2000, when the attempts to exploit the situation by both conservative politicians and leaders of the anti-Castro lobby revealed the irrationality of the Cuba policy.Under the leadership of George W. Bush, there has been a further weakening of the embargo, and again it is due to domestic pressure — this time from members of Congress from farm states, keen to promote food exports to Cuba, and from the business sector. Policy continuity, pragmatism, symbolic concessions to embargo supporters, and business opportunities have thus been the dominant (and often contradictory) notes in this administration’s approach. The authors conclude that “the ground on which the embargo policy is now built, ground cultivated in the 1980s, is eroding” (p. 10). Certainly, votes in both houses have illustrated a desire for change. The authors quote Jeff Flake (R-AZ), who notes (correctly) that “U.S. business, tourism, and farm-state politics are overtaking Miami politics on this issue” (p. 138).Implicit in this study is a strong undercurrent of criticism of the embargo itself. In essence it is a failed policy, even though various administrations have sought to make it work for almost five decades. In November 2005, 182 member nations of the UN reached the same conclusion, voting to condemn it. One wonders what it will take, some ten presidents later, to bring about a change in American foreign policy. Certainly, it is a change that is long overdue.

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