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Record W1996999179 · doi:10.2202/1935-1704.1591

A Theory of Credibility under Commitment

2010· article· en· W1996999179 on OpenAlexaff
Daniel Monte

Bibliographic record

VenueThe B E Journal of Theoretical Economics · 2010
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicGame Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsSimon Fraser University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCommitCredibilityBayesian gameMicroeconomicsEconomicsStochastic gameClass (philosophy)RationalityContingencyBayesian probabilityMathematical economicsRepeated gameGame theoryComputer science

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

The ability to commit to a contract may increase a player's payoff. In a repeated relationship, the lack of a complete contingency contract is usually explained by the presence of contracting costs. We study optimal contracts in a specific class of credibility models: relationships in which the surplus comes solely from screening. We show that the optimal contract is to reproduce the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game without commitment. In this sense, sequential rationality constraints do not bind. Therefore, we provide an alternative explanation for why a specific class of long-term relationships may often not be contracted upon.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.019
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.002
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.026
Threshold uncertainty score0.999

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0190.002
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.002
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0020.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0020.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.071
GPT teacher head0.353
Teacher spread0.282 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations1
Published2010
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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