MétaCan
Menu
Back to cohort
Record W1998771970 · doi:10.7202/203256ar

Descartes face à Leibniz sur la question de la substance

2007· article· fr· W1998771970 on OpenAlexvenueno aff
Josiane Boulad Ayoub

Bibliographic record

VenuePhilosophiques · 2007
Typearticle
Languagefr
FieldArts and Humanities
TopicHistorical Philosophy and Science
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsHumanitiesPhilosophy

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Il s'agit de montrer l'équivocité de la notion de substance quand on la prend à la fois chez Descartes et chez Leibniz, et de comparer à propos de ce problème les positions des deux philosophes. La question est abordée sous l'angle du rapport entre les modifications de rôle et de sens de la notion de substance telle qu'elles apparaissent chez les deux représentants des tendances constitutives de l'epistême classique. La confrontation sert à préciser, d'une part, les déterminations ontologiques du maintien de cette notion dans les problématiques respectives de Descartes et de Leibniz; d'autre part, elle vise à alimenter d'une pièce supplémentaire le débat sur la différence entre les enjeux du rationalisme cartésien et celui leibnizien.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.003
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.004
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.006
Threshold uncertainty score0.025

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0030.004
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0020.002
Science and technology studies0.0030.024
Scholarly communication0.0050.006
Open science0.0010.003
Research integrity0.0030.005
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0060.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.132
GPT teacher head0.323
Teacher spread0.191 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations1
Published2007
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

Explore more

Same venuePhilosophiquesSame topicHistorical Philosophy and ScienceFrench-language works237,207