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Record W200529490

An incentive mechanism for promoting honesty in e-marketplaces

2007· article· en· W200529490 on OpenAlexaff
Jie Zhang

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicAccess Control and Trust
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Waterloo
Fundersnot available
KeywordsIncentiveReputationBusinessOrder (exchange)HonestyTrustworthinessCompetition (biology)CheatingMarketingAdvertisingInternet privacyMicroeconomicsComputer scienceEconomicsPsychologySocial psychologyFinance
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Problem to be Addressed Our research is within the subfield of modeling trust and reputation in multi-agent systems for electronic commerce. More specifically, we are interested in addressing two prob-lems that may arise in trust and reputation models where buying agents elicit opinions about selling agents from other buyers (known as advisors) in the marketplace: • Unfair ratings of sellers provided to buyers • Developing incentives for buyers to report their ratings of sellers To explain, the ratings provided by advisors are possibly un-fair. Buyers may provide unfairly high ratings to promote the seller. This is referred to as “ballot stuffing ” (Dellaro-cas 2000). Buyers may also provide unfairly low ratings, in order to cooperate with other sellers to drive a seller out

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.305
Threshold uncertainty score0.971

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.015
GPT teacher head0.338
Teacher spread0.324 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2007
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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