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Record W200529490

An incentive mechanism for promoting honesty in e-marketplaces

2007· article· en· W200529490 on OpenAlexaff
Jie Zhang

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicAccess Control and Trust
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Waterloo
Fundersnot available
KeywordsIncentiveReputationBusinessOrder (exchange)HonestyTrustworthinessCompetition (biology)CheatingMarketingAdvertisingInternet privacyMicroeconomicsComputer scienceEconomicsPsychologySocial psychologyFinance
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Problem to be Addressed Our research is within the subfield of modeling trust and reputation in multi-agent systems for electronic commerce. More specifically, we are interested in addressing two prob-lems that may arise in trust and reputation models where buying agents elicit opinions about selling agents from other buyers (known as advisors) in the marketplace: • Unfair ratings of sellers provided to buyers • Developing incentives for buyers to report their ratings of sellers To explain, the ratings provided by advisors are possibly un-fair. Buyers may provide unfairly high ratings to promote the seller. This is referred to as “ballot stuffing ” (Dellaro-cas 2000). Buyers may also provide unfairly low ratings, in order to cooperate with other sellers to drive a seller out

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.016
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.072
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.016
Threshold uncertainty score0.087

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0160.072
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0020.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0020.004
Scholarly communication0.0040.015
Open science0.0040.005
Research integrity0.0060.004
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0110.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.015
GPT teacher head0.338
Teacher spread0.324 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2007
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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