Persuasive Communications: Tax Compliance Enforcement Strategies for Sole Proprietors*
Bibliographic record
Abstract
CAR Vol.24 No. 1 (Spring 2007) Revenue (IR), which is the equivalent of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the United States.Taxpayers frequently engage the services of paid preparers, who play a key role in the tax environment with responsibilities to both their clients and to the state (Erard 1993;Nichols and Ellis Price 2004).Indeed, there now is a substantial literature on the role of paid preparers in the United States (Roberts 1998).One key aspect of this literature has been to examine compliance levels associated with the use of a paid preparer by analyzing data from IRS tax audits.The direction of the results, however, has been inconclusive (Hite and Hasseldine 2003;Christian, Gupta, Webber, and Willis 1994).Nonetheless, most agree that the paid preparer does affect the process, one way or the other.The current study is the first to distinguish between the effects of normative and sanction-based appeals on actual self-prepared and paid-preparer returns.In order to analyze the role of paid preparers and the effect of persuasive communications, we examine three research questions: (a) whether targeted written communications are effective strategies for a tax agency, (b) which of five strategies tend to be more effective, and (c) whether the effectiveness of these strategies varies by type of preparer.This paper makes its contribution through an innovative, controlled field experiment that analyzes how actual tax-reporting behavior is affected by exposure to one of five treatments: simple offer of assistance, citizenship appeal, threat of audit, threat of audit with possible penalties, and virtual guarantee of forthcoming audit once the return is filed.Sales and net profit data are analyzed for a nationwide sample of over 7,300 UK sole proprietors who, for two consecutive tax years, reported a turnover (sales) level just below a fixed threshold of £15,000.Taxpayers with turnover below the threshold qualify for a simplified format for tax reporting, allowing them to reduce their costs of compliance.Thus, temptation to reduce tax liability, as well as costs of compliance, makes the sole proprietors an intriguing and appropriate population to target for this research.Consequently, we focus on two dependent variables: (a) whether turnover exceeded the reporting threshold and (b) the monetary increase in net profit reported on the tax returns filed after the treatment letters were received.Our results show evidence of a significant overall treatment effect for both normative and sanction groups.Specifically, when we measure whether taxpayers reported increases in turnover (over the £15,000 threshold for simplified reporting) after receipt of the letter, there are significant differences for each treatment group on one or both of the dependent variables.We use ordinary least squares (OLS) and probit regressions to examine the impact of the treatment letters contingent on preparation mode, and we find that the communications are particularly effective for self-preparers when reporting turnover.We also find that the sanction letters are generally more effective than the normative citizenship letter for reported turnover.In addition, the sanction letters are more effective than the normative letter for change in net profit but only for the self-prepared returns, not for the paid-preparer returns.This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that written communication strategies can be effective tools for improving actual taxpayer compliance.Prior research reported mixed results and did not demonstrate specific 19113846, 2007, 1,
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.004 | 0.038 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.017 | 0.002 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".