Bibliographic record
Abstract
Adopting a holistic approach, Canada's policy of defence, diplomacy, and development advocates intergovernmental cooperation to address the challenges posed by new wars, the security-development nexus, and failed states.' Unfortunately, the promised benefits of a whole-of-government approach to overseas missions have yet to be realized in its Afghan application. Government rhetoric touting communication, collaboration, and cooperation between the three key partners is pervasive, yet few results on the ground support these claims.This article examines some challenges encountered in the implementation of a 3D approach in Afghanistan, and argues that the creation of integrated policies alone is insufficient to address the challenges posed by new wars and the interrelation of security and development. While limited in scope to the period ending in 2007, evidence from Canada's Afghan operations during this period indicates that a whole-of-govemment policy must be accompanied by shifts in departmental culture, structures, and mandates. Operationally, there is also demand for the creation of standard practices and interdepartmental decision-making mechanisms, predicated on a government- wide operating concept. Thus, this article will offer practitioners and policymakers an analysis of lessons learned that, if applied, might help to increase the probability for success in future integrated missions.It is likely that Canadian foreign policy will, for the foreseeable future, be predicated on whole-of-government principles, regardless of which party is in power or the formal name hung on major policy documents. Articulating the challenges of a 3D approach is of merit as it illuminates issues that must be addressed if Canada is to achieve its desired goals abroad. Furthermore, while some practitioners have dismissed the policy's practicality due to current difficulties in implementation, little research examines the underlying causes of these difficulties. Though limited to Canadian policy implementation, this study's conclusions have broader implications, given that a number of allied governments are implementing similar approaches.One caveat guides this analysis. With an ongoing campaign, evidence must be interpreted with the knowledge that the policy implementation is in progress. While substantial change cannot occur overnight, whether in theatre or interdepartmentally, some problems in the early implementation of a 3D approach may have already been identified and overcome. However, these facts do not negate the merit of this analysis. If an understanding ofthe policy's current implementation, successes, and failings is not obtained, its success in future applications may be limited.NEW WARS AND THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUSThe development of whole-of-government approaches to foreign policy has generally been attributed to the changing nature ofthe international security environment, new wars, and the security-development nexus. Emerging at the end of the 20th century, the concept of new wars in a changed international security environment has been argued most strongly by Mary Kaldor, in New and Old Wars. Kaldor argues that the Cold War was the last great global battle between states, and that in its aftermath, new wars, involving state power and a variety of private forces - engaging in new forms of violence - have emerged, thereby demanding an updated vocabulary and theoretical framework.2Kaldor develops the new wars concept by arguing that post-Cold War conflicts have signalled an end to old-fashioned warfare with the emergence of a new political economy of war. In the new wars, the goal is not military victory but political mobilization. Unlike old wars, where people were mobilized to participate in the war effort, in new wars, mobilizing people is the aim of the war effort. Battles are rare and violence is directed against civilians by organized networks, which flourish in states where taxation has collapsed, little new wealth is created, and governmental structures and the rule of law are weak. …
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.004 | 0.005 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.008 | 0.021 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.016 | 0.014 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.008 |
| Research integrity | 0.004 | 0.006 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.010 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".