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Record W2027426638 · doi:10.1002/jhm.788

Quality and financial outcomes from gainsharing for inpatient admissions: A three‐year experience

2010· article· en· W2027426638 on OpenAlexaboutno aff
I. Michael Leitman, Ruth Levin, Michael Lipp, Latha Sivaprasad, Christine J. Karalakulasingam, David S. Bernard, Patricia Friedmann, David J. Shulkin

Bibliographic record

VenueJournal of Hospital Medicine · 2010
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicHealthcare Policy and Management
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsMedicineMedicaidQuarter (Canadian coin)PaymentIncentiveIncentive programEmergency medicineFamily medicineMedical emergencyHealth careFinanceBusiness

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

BACKGROUND: Gainsharing is a way to provide incentives to physicians to decrease hospital costs without compromising quality. METHODS: A pay-for-performance program was instituted over a three-year period from July 2006 to June 2009. Baseline length of stay (LOS) and case costs were developed during the year prior to the inception of the program. Best practice norms (BPNs) were established at the top 25th percentile of physicians for each all patient refined (APR)-diagnosis related group (DRG). Hospital costs were analyzed in several areas, including operating room charge (OR), supplies and implants, nursing and per-diem room costs. Payments were based upon case level performance compared to BPN's and the physician's historic performance. Eligible cases included commercial insurance only for the first 2 years but Medicare cases were included after October 2008 resulting from a Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)-approved demonstration project. Payments to physicians required meeting quality thresholds, including chart completion, and compliance with core measures. RESULTS: A total of 184 (54%) physicians enrolled into the program. There was a $25.1 million reduction in hospital costs during the 3 years ($16 million from participating and $9.1 million from non-participating physicians, P < 0.01). Most cost reductions were attributed to reduced LOS and reductions in medical supply costs. Total physician payouts were over $2 million (average $1,866 per quarter). Delinquent medical records decreased from an average of 43% in the second quarter 2006 to 30% (P < 0.0001) in the second quarter 2009. Quality measures improved during the study period but not by a statistical significance. CONCLUSIONS: Gainsharing provided an incentive for physicians to reduce hospital costs while maintaining hospital quality.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.004
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.152
Threshold uncertainty score0.486

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.004
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.095
GPT teacher head0.349
Teacher spread0.255 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations18
Published2010
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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