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Record W2030653824 · doi:10.1257/aer.102.2.780

Competition through Commissions and Kickbacks

2012· article· en· W2030653824 on OpenAlexaff
Roman Inderst, Marco Ottaviani

Bibliographic record

VenueAmerican Economic Review · 2012
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicMerger and Competition Analysis
Canadian institutionsKellogg's (Canada)
Fundersnot available
KeywordsIntermediaryCompetition (biology)Unintended consequencesNormativeIncentiveProduct (mathematics)Financial intermediaryBusinessEconomicsWelfarePublic economicsMicroeconomicsFinanceMarket economyLawPolitical science

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In markets for retail financial products and health services, consumers often rely on the advice of intermediaries to decide which specialized offering best fits their needs. Product providers, in turn, compete to influence the intermediaries' advice through hidden kickbacks or disclosed commissions. Motivated by the controversial role of these widespread practices, we formulate a model to analyze competition through commissions from a positive and normative standpoint. The model highlights the role of commissions in making the advisor responsive to supply-side incentives. We characterize situations when commonly adopted policies such as mandatory disclosure and caps on commissions have unintended welfare consequences. (JEL D21, D82, D83, G21, L15, L25)

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.006
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.027
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.014
Threshold uncertainty score0.046

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0060.027
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0020.007
Scholarly communication0.0070.007
Open science0.0020.003
Research integrity0.0060.003
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0140.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.038
GPT teacher head0.275
Teacher spread0.238 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations338
Published2012
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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Same venueAmerican Economic ReviewSame topicMerger and Competition AnalysisFrench-language works237,207