Surging Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] WHEN THE UNITED States surged an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan in 2009-10, they enabled the training of an additional 113,000 soldiers and police, a corresponding Afghan surge. Together, the combined force of 150,000 NATO troops and 305,000 National Army, Air Force, and Police has enabled the start of geographic transition, which began in July 2011 and will be complete by December 2014. Through the geographic transition process, NATO transfers lead responsibility to forces and shifts from a combat role to an advise and assist role. As forces train to assume lead, combined NATO-Afghan operations are also clearing insurgent strongholds in Helmand, Kandahar, and Kunduz Provinces. Normalcy is slowly returning to areas that once only knew war. Local militias are integrating into the formal structure, commerce is returning, and schools are opening. Afghanistan's gross domestic product has increased from $170 under the Taliban to $1,000 per capita in 2010. Almost all Afghans now have access to basic health services (only nine percent did in 2002). School enrollment increased from 900,000 (mainly boys) to almost seven million (37 percent girls). Women now serve in government, and female officers are even training to become pilots. Further, most of the country is now connected via mobile phones (15 million Afghans use mobile phones), highways, and a common purpose--to assume responsibility for its own development, governance, and security. While the surge is incomplete and still reversible, it was by no means pre-ordained. Though the international community had been supporting the government, military, and police for several years, efforts suffered from limited resources and poor unity of effort. In 2009, the force was underpaid, poorly trained, ill-equipped, illiterate, and poorly led. The National Army could not conduct counterinsurgency operations, and soldiers were deserting faster than could be recruited. The police were employed before being trained and lacked the armor needed to survive in a counterinsurgency environment. Their limited capabilities, poor morale, and leadership deficit could not prevent the Taliban from regrouping and conducting attacks. Numerous government and nongovernment studies documented rising violence rates and the shortcomings in the National Security Force. In spite of these challenges, the international community committed to grow the force in 2009 and rebuild the army, air force, and police through a security force assistance surge. Investing in Unity of Command Recognizing the shortcomings of the past and the challenges for the future, a concerted effort was made to unify international action when NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) was created in November 2009. The command linked the resources of the U.S.-led Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) with the depth and expertise of a NATO command. As a dual-hatted command, critical professional gaps could be filled by NATO countries. At the same time, NTM-A was organized to support the ministries it was charged to advise and develop. For example, a single intelligence director was responsible for both providing intelligence to the command and partnering with the army and police intelligence to train, advise, and assist. The same was true across the J-coded staff, which is matrixed to deputy commanding generals responsible for developing the army, air force, and police. [FIGURE 1 OMITTED] The true benefit of the unified command of CSTC-A and NTM-A, however, was evident when it came to police training. For years, think tanks documented the poor results of police training efforts by disparate organizations. However, as a NATO command, NTM-A was able to leverage the expertise from national police forces like the Italian Carabinieri, French Gendarme, Spanish Guardia Civil, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. …
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it