Joint Secure Beamforming Design at the Source and the Relay for an Amplify-and-Forward MIMO Untrusted Relay System
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Bibliographic record
Abstract
An amplify-and-forward (AF) multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) relay network composed of a source, a relay, and a destination is considered, where transmit beamforming is employed both at the source and at the relay. The relay is a user who is willing to help the communication from the source to the destination. In our paper, however, the relay is untrusted in the sense that it may make a passive security attack; that is, it may decode messages of the source. We consider two ways to transmit confidential information of the source to the destination: noncooperative secure beamforming and cooperative secure beamforming. In the noncooperative scheme, the relay is simply treated as an eavesdropper, and does not participate in communication. In the cooperative scheme, the relay is asked to relay signals from the source to the destination. In this paper, the source and relay beamforming is jointly designed to maximize the secrecy rate in the cooperative scheme. The conditions under which the cooperative scheme achieves a higher secrecy rate than the noncooperative scheme are derived in the low and high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regimes of the source-relay and relay-destination links. The performance of the secure beamforming schemes is compared through extensive numerical simulations.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it