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<scp>Bargaining by Limiting Cooperation: Withholding Consent for the Level of a Public Good</scp>

2008· article· en· W2032802857 on OpenAlexaff
Peter Burton

Bibliographic record

VenueJournal of Public Economic Theory · 2008
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Canadian institutionsDalhousie University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsPublic goodEconomicsLimitingOutcome (game theory)Marginal costAttritionMicroeconomicsSubstitution (logic)Private goodPrivate information retrievalMarginal utilityLimit (mathematics)Public economicsMathematics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Abstract This paper analyzes how the ability to limit cooperation influences the outcome of complete information bargaining between two players. When cooperation involves prompt resolution of a conflict, as in alternating‐offer games and wars‐of‐attrition, the solutions equate the marginal rates of substitution between earlier resolution and more private goods. When cooperation involves consent for the level of a public good, the outcome again equates the marginal rates of substitution between greater cooperation (more public good) and more private goods (lower cost shares). Here, the equilibrium consists of balanced linear cost shares given by the ratio of marginal‐willingness‐to‐pay to marginal cost.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.006
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.002
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.864
Threshold uncertainty score0.884

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0060.002
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0010.001
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.248
GPT teacher head0.353
Teacher spread0.104 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations1
Published2008
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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