Transparent Representation: Photography and the Art of Casting

Roger Scruton, in his essay “Photography and Representation,” notoriously argued that photography is not a representational art form.1 Not only did he argue that one cannot have a genuine aesthetic interest in the representational natures, broadly understood, of photographs, but he also argued that in a narrower and more important sense, photographs are not even representations at all. Although in much of the literature on this issue, the former claim has been contested, the latter claim has been largely ignored.2 And on the few occasions it is addressed, it is simply conceded that photographs are not, in Scruton's sense, representations.3 In my view, however, contra Scruton's critics, if photographs are not representations, then one cannot have a genuine aesthetic interest in their representational natures (however broadly construed). As a result, any attempt to defend an aesthetic interest in the representational natures of photographs that ignores or concedes Scruton's claim vis‐à‐vis their status as representations is doomed to failure. Nevertheless, contra Scruton, photographs are (or can be) representations in his sense. Hence, the status of photography as a representational art form is secure. This article consists of four parts. First, I offer a reconstruction of Scruton's argument. Second, I present a number of responses to Scruton's argument that ignore or concede the claim that photographs are not representations and explain why they are inadequate. Third, I argue contra Scruton that photographs are representations. And finally, I consider a number of potential responses to my argument. Strictly speaking, the target of Scruton's argument is not photography per se, but rather what he calls “ideal photography.”4 Ideal photography is characterized by a nonintentional causal relationship between the photograph and the photographic subject, a relationship that entails both that the subject exists and is (or was) as it appears in the photograph. A photograph departs from this ideal when it is the product of an attempt “to pollute the ideal of [the] craft with the aims and methods of painting.”5 This includes such things as altering the photographic plate—“[the photographer] can proceed to paint things out or in, to touch up, alter or pasticher as he pleases”—photo‐montage, and, presumably, photoshopped images.6 Scruton can be fruitfully understood to be offering two distinct arguments for the conclusion that photography is not a representational art form: the master “representation” argument and the subsidiary “style” or “detail” argument.7 I will consider each in turn. Scruton's master argument relies on two distinct and independent premises, each of which requires some comment: (M1) Ideal photographs are not representations. (M2) If ideal photographs are not representations, there cannot be a genuine aesthetic interest in their representational natures. (C) There cannot be a genuine aesthetic interest in the representational natures of ideal photographs. One might, of course, think that the conclusion of the master argument more or less trivially follows from (M1). After all, if photographs are not representations, then they do not have any representational natures for there to be any kind of interest in. In order to understand (M2) to make a substantive claim, as I think we must, a distinction will have to be drawn between a broader and narrower sense of representation. This will be taken up in more detail below. Let us consider, first, (M1). A picture is a representation, in Scruton's sense, just in case it stands in a certain sort of intentional relation to a subject. In particular, it has to express a thought about the subject—“a thought embodied in perceptual form”—and thereby offer an interpretation of reality, rather than a “presentation of how something looked.”8 Moreover, pictures that are representations are fictionally competent: the represented subject need not exist, and even if it does, it need not appear as represented by the picture. Scruton takes paintings to be the paradigmatic examples of pictorial representations. Scruton argues, however, that ideal photographs are not representations in this sense. Because an ideal photograph stands in a causal, rather than an intentional, relation to the photographic subject, it is not fictionally competent: the subject must exist and be as it appears in the photograph (at least at the time the photograph was taken). And even if the photographer intends to express a thought about the subject, “it is neither necessary nor even possible that the photographer's intention should enter as a serious factor in determining how the picture is seen.”9 There are, of course, cases in which we might be tempted to characterize a photograph as a work of fiction, as when someone “take[s] a photograph of a draped nude and call[s] it Venus.”10 But such cases involve photographs of representations—photographs of subjects that independently represent various things—rather than photographic representations per se. As Scruton puts it, “the representational act, the act which embodies the representational thought, is completed before the photograph is ever taken.”11 Let us turn now to (M2). Scruton offers three distinct reasons that one might have for an aesthetic interest in a picture. First, one might have an interest in the formal properties of the picture, appreciating it merely as a pattern of lines and colors. Second, one might have an interest in the subject of the picture and, hence, an interest in the picture in a derivative sense as means of perceiving or otherwise accessing the properties of the subject. And finally, one might have an interest in the picture qua picture: an interest in the representational nature of the picture, but for its own sake and not for the sake of the represented subject. And not only does Scruton claim that the latter interest “forms the core of the aesthetic experience of pictorial art,” but he also claims it is required of representational art: “[only] if there is such a thing as aesthetic interest which has representation as its object can there be representational art.”12 Note: having a representational nature does not presuppose that a picture is a representation in Scruton's narrow sense; it only requires that there be a pictorial subject—something the picture is a picture of. Now Scruton's thesis that one can have an aesthetic interest in a picture qua picture only if it is a representation rests on the assumption that a properly aesthetic appreciation of something is indifferent to truth. Just as the existence of Odysseus and occurrence of the events described in the Odyssey are irrelevant to an aesthetic appreciation of it as a literary work, a correspondence between a picture and the world is irrelevant to an aesthetic appreciation of the picture.13 Instead (of truth), what is of aesthetic interest is the thought expressed by the picture and how that thought is embodied in pictorial form—how by depicting a feature of the pictorial subject in a certain way, a thought about that subject is expressed.14 Since ideal photographs and other nonrepresentational pictures do not express thoughts—offering instead of an interpretation of reality merely a presentation of it—one cannot have an aesthetic interest in their representational natures, but rather only in their subjects (and formal properties). Although not the central topic of this article, it is worth saying a few words about Scruton's subsidiary detail or style argument at this point.15 Like the master argument, it can be formulated, as follows, in terms of two premises and a conclusion: (S1) If the representational natures of ideal photographs were of aesthetic interest, then ideal photographers would have (sufficient) control over detail (to have a photographic style). (S2) Ideal photographers lack (sufficient) control over detail (for photographic style). (C) The representational natures of ideal photographs are not of aesthetic interest. There are a couple of comments worth making at this point. First, by “detail,” Scruton means the observable features of a picture. And second, the counterfactual formulation of (S1) should be noted.16 Since, according to Scruton, ideal photographs are not representations, the material condition, If the representational natures of ideal photographs are of aesthetic interest, then ideal photographers do have (sufficient) control over detail, is, again in Scruton's view, trivially true. The counterfactual claim is, nevertheless, substantive. Most commentators on Scruton's paper have focused on the detail or style argument.17 In particular, while apparently conceding (S1), these commentators have typically taken issue with (S2), arguing that photographers do have significant amounts of control over the observable features of their photographs. The kind of control they exercise can be subdivided into three categories: they can control a photograph's surface and formal properties; they can influence—via focal length, exposure, and the like—which features of the photographic subject appear most clearly in the photograph; and they can exercise choice, not merely over the photographic subject and the point of view from which it is photographed, but also over which of the numerous images they record to print and display. Note: this latter form of choice will play an important role in what follows. Scruton's basic line on such suggestions is that they either yield insufficient control for there to be any kind of photographic style or involve a departure from the photographic ideal to a form of painting bound by “largely unnecessary constraints.”18 It is, however, a difficult matter to adjudicate this particular dispute without an account of how much control of detail is sufficient for photographic style and how various kinds of control facilitate it, as well as an account of what sort of techniques, deployed to what degree, result in the abandonment of photography in favor of (unnecessarily constrained) painting. But, as Lopes argues, even if the proposed techniques, individually or in unison, yield adequate control of detail without abandoning the photographic ideal, this does not suffice to establish that there can be a genuine aesthetic interest in the representational natures of ideal photographs.19 After all, that photographers exercise sufficient control over their images for them to have a photographic style is compatible with Scruton's thesis that one can have a genuine aesthetic interest only in the formal features of a photograph or the photographic subject rather than the photograph's representational nature. Lopes, in my view his on Scruton's master argument. But, as I he concedes Scruton's ideal photographs are not instead that one can have an aesthetic interest in photographs qua photographs even they are not In this I contra Lopes, that Scruton's (M2) is more at least that Lopes has not And in the I contra Scruton and Lopes, that ideal photographs can be representations. It is worth that Lopes photographic by means of at a one the photographic a photographic subject a photograph is a kind of to which is, of course, distinct in important from or nevertheless, both and are of is a thesis than Scruton's claim of a nonintentional causal (and relation between photographs and their Scruton does at with the some sense, at a photograph is a for at the thing present I simply concede that photographs are in this sense. Now Lopes that photographs are a interest in a photograph as a photograph is an interest in the photographic subject the photograph. As a result, that is required to Scruton's (M2) is to that one can have an aesthetic interest in an object a photograph that cannot be by the object this Lopes between and photographs their at of in the of the the that the object is to an object a photograph is in of a that alter or its properties; and a is in the sense that experience consists both of the photographic subject and the And Lopes that photographic can have two of aesthetic properties in of these First, it to features of difficult to And second, it can yield and by properties not be to have what I to be the central of argument, there are a couple of worth about the in which he the distinction between and First, certain photographic techniques, such as involve as as or As a result, contra Lopes, such photographs at least do not at in but rather only record features which of hence, they than can be And second, just as an object a photograph is in of a that can its an object is in of a which can its for the on when he or As a result, can yield and in more or less the sense as The central with argument is that it to establish that one can have an aesthetic interest in a photograph as a photograph that is not derivative an aesthetic interest in the photographic subject. Lopes does, of course, is not an interest to the it is an interest in the as it is the But in my view, this is to his of having an aesthetic interest in the photographic subject with having an aesthetic interest in the photographic subject if Lopes is that one have an aesthetic interest in an object a photograph that not be by it this is compatible with an aesthetic interest in both kinds of derivative of an aesthetic interest in the is important to is that or not in per se, but in the properties that they have at various and certain the one might the point the of an object is of aesthetic interest only certain of its properties or can be only by particular at particular and can be a of in a of central claim is, at that certain properties of can be only by means of photographic But, as the is of other just as an on the of someone for a can be only photographic the on when he or I can be only this is the is a distinction between having an aesthetic interest in photographic any of its own sake and having an interest in it as a even the only the properties of an object in which one has an aesthetic interest. In order to Scruton's Lopes would have to establish the in he has only the The we have an interest in an object as a photograph we is not simply an interest in the object per and cannot be by it in some other that is the only means of the properties of the object in which we are than my is to it and (M1) instead by arguing that photographs are (or can be) representations in Scruton's sense. Lopes has argued that this requires the the conclusion of the core argument, that photographs do not means that photographs are In my view, however, Lopes is simply on this representation is, in compatible with As a result, I about photographic I simply concede it for present and argue that photographs can be representations. A of the argument on offer is a distinction between what might be the pictorial object and the pictorial subject, that is, what a picture is of and what it is The object of a picture is something that the kind of causal role in its The object of a photograph is or the was at and focused on when the picture was And the object of a painting is the the when he or The subject of a picture, in is the that the picture or a thought (or as it is a or product of what the picture means or how it is rather than the causal by which it was There are, of course, various of of various for the the an to be the product of the or in it to be a of features of the art object and features of the and in which it was And it to be by the of interpretation But the account of there to be to in the pictorial object and the pictorial subject have to Nevertheless, Scruton's argument to presuppose that photographs either lack pictorial subjects or the photographic subject and the photographic object must Although he does not the Scruton's something as first, photographs have and second, again what in by and their Moreover, as Lopes would have it, photographs are then when one at a one its The is to these about photographic photographs can both have subjects and photographic subjects and can this a distinction to be drawn between two methods of and making something by means of or various kinds of in this paintings as well as various of is important about such representations is the by the and their features are the As a result, how the subject is represented is largely control as And it is the lack of control over the of hence, over how the photographic subject is it, that Scruton to the existence of photographic subjects or them with photographic But this is to the of representation by than making something from a of of what I have in such things as art and but I to on for and The from various of not of need have for the a number of to the in a play or of course, and representation such things as and in to in a Nevertheless, there be a art of a to represent a by the is however, is that a (and of to the can have as much control over how the (or is represented as does a or Moreover, not only is fictionally are in the of even when the subject is a can be represented as other than in is simply by an properties from of the subject. As a result, there is to the that can be representational and, hence, that can about the subjects thereby I to argue is that photographs can representations in Scruton's sense a of representational record of images from which they a to print and display. As a result, they are of a of control over the of the photographs that they to represent various photographic Just as particular of painting pictorial of the a photograph object a certain can be of the photographic as the photographic subject is or a of And this of control over the of photographs, there is to that photographs are fictionally or of their subjects other than they in are, they can be representations in Scruton's sense. In photography can be fruitfully understood as an art of representational Scruton's to the kind of on offer is to claim that in the kinds of cases that I have in it is not the photograph that the subject, but rather the photographic I a photograph of a draped nude and it but as this can be understood as an exercise in fiction, it should not be thought of as a photographic representation of but rather as a photograph of a representation of Scruton's is that the object its status as a representation before the photograph is of the more the intentional of the photographer or the object was independently a representation, a or an in a for There are, however, a couple of reasons to at Scruton's argument. First, by of this would that paintings that are are pictures of representations rather than pictorial representations a result that Scruton would not After all, there is to that a representational about photographer's about the object of his photographs. And to any attempt to between painting and photography by to the of control have over the of their I that a and of images to photographers have a of control over the of the pictures they display. Second, there is to in photographers their representational to their photographs. In particular, the both to of a of images as of a photographic and how to them can be and are well the photographs have been Scruton does consider the latter photographer] were to a photograph of a and it But he it on the of an he between a photographic representational act to the photograph and a representational act while at the photographic Scruton that by means of some such one might turn the object into a representation, but he that the be a that conclusion is to to between what is and what is in the of a representational And the that the is is that it is merely one of of act of might on some other be by a (or a or a or any other which what it the in the case at is merely a of and a photograph taken with it is not a representation in its own There are a number of reasons to at Scruton's argument First, rather than on as Scruton would have it, the that photographers can their representational only the photographs that they have been taken is in genuine photographic for such as and of photographs taken by other Second, the Scruton between a and a is are not of are to record images of not to point at One might with claim that are of to point at And even if are of in the kinds of cases the was not to at and representational status photographic any representational only the photographs were As a result, rather than photographs to play an role in the of representational thought by other of the by means of which the latter object their representational are characterized as representations in their own distinct from their Moreover, their status as representations is independent of that of their they can be representations even if their are this however, someone might that this latter is with photographic If photographs are then to photographs is to their As a result, as experience one to a representational thought, it is the photographic object that embodies or this hence, the object must be a representation if the photograph course, this does not out a representational thought while the photograph a pattern of lines and would not, of course, that the photographic object be a representation. But as interest is in photographs qua photographs are representations, such will There are a number of of which the of representation can First, even if entails that the photographic object is a representation if the photograph is, the representational status of the photograph is in an important sense The object is a representation the photograph is, but not the photograph is not a representation it is of a representation. Moreover, the photographic object is properly as a representation only when the photograph; if or a the object would not be properly Second, as Lopes the experience of photographs as photographs a kind of in the sense that the both the photographic object and the photograph is with of a As a result, as as one of the two of photograph or the photographic a representation, an experience of the photograph as a photograph can an to a representational Hence, there is to that photographs can be representations only if their Moreover, is an intentional a that a photograph is of without that the photographic at least not when or other photographs and a when a photograph as a in my view, is one of it as a can the photograph as in some kind of relation to the photographic subject without the photographic object in a relation to the subject. Let In the case of representation, an (or as a (or the of the that is, in what might be the sense of the now the case of pictorial representation. It of course, be a to of the picture that it is, in any sense, the pictorial subject. what one is that the picture is of the subject, that is, that the subject of the picture is the pictorial But what I to is that this does not of the photographic object that it is, in some sense, to the photographic subject. for that I was the object or of a photograph subject was this photograph as a representation would that the photographic object is but this would not that I was course, an from the photographic object a representational photograph that photographs are, in But this would be to to the photograph as a to the as the of rather than of the they I would that in he of the photographic object that it was the subject. One Scruton might that I have the central point of his After all, what I have at is that photographs can be as representations in a sense, which he a photograph of as a representation of in the that I might have a or a or a photograph of But what Scruton means to establish is photographs, paintings are is why representation can be thought of as an of a painting and not just a of some of which the painting a Just as a of a has a that can be understood independently of its in particular of a painting has a that be understood in from the of its There are a couple of comments that I to make in to this potential First, even if Scruton is that photographs are not representations, they can be representations per of representational the thought expressed cannot be by a photograph's properties it can be by such features as the of work, and the in which Moreover, it is a that is of aesthetic interest all, to the with the or of a is not what is of interest, but rather the thought expressed by And second, how a painting its subject be an but it the sense of having a pictorial subject at what it are After all, not only can is a painting well as Scruton a painting need not even its subject at all. Hence, to if a painting one will have to to features the Scruton might, of course, to the view that the sense in which paintings are representations but in which photographs are not is that paintings can be in sense without for a painting can be a without there a particular or that it But not only does this to the of Scruton's is, all, in the that paintings can represent their subjects other than they in are that them of representational as as we do not simply the photographic subject with the photographic there is to think the is not of photographs.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.