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Record W2041247631 · doi:10.1002/ett.2868

Cooperative bargaining game‐theoretic methodology for 5G wireless heterogeneous networks

2014· article· en· W2041247631 on OpenAlex
Chungang Yang, Jiandong Li, Alagan Anpalagan

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueTransactions on Emerging Telecommunications Technologies · 2014
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicCooperative Communication and Network Coding
Canadian institutionsToronto Metropolitan University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsComputer scienceGame theoryWireless networkWirelessCooperative game theoryComputer networkMathematical economicsEconomicsTelecommunications

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

ABSTRACT Cooperative game‐theoretic modelling, analysis and design are critical to mitigate interference and save energy for 5G wireless evolution. Nash axiomatic cooperative game has been widely used to model various cooperation‐motivated technical problems, notably in signal processing and communications. However, its most potentials have not been fully exploited, for example, different trade‐offs between efficiency and fairness, where efficiency is referred to as both spectral efficiency (SE) and energy efficiency (EE). The trade‐offs can be determined by various cooperative solution concepts, for example, the favourable Nash bargaining solution and its rarely studied extensions. Therefore, we first overview the basics of the celebrated Nash bargaining solution and its extensions with geometric interpretations to help better understand them and facilitate distributed algorithm design. Then, both symmetric and asymmetric cooperative game‐theoretic frameworks are formulated with different trade‐offs incorporating an asymmetric unified β ‐coefficient determined cooperative game model. As a use case, an α ‐parameter‐related preference function is designed first incorporating both SE and EE. Then, the presented frameworks with the new preference function are studied in a typical heterogeneous network. In the following text, we characterise the effects of β ‐coefficient to fairness and efficiency and α ‐parameter to SE and EE. Finally, we conclude the article with the hope of stimulating more interest in cooperative bargaining game and its wider applications in the signalling and communication communities. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMeta-epidemiology (narrow), Science and technology studies
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Methods · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.848
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0030.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.058
GPT teacher head0.320
Teacher spread0.261 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it