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Record W2042542933 · doi:10.1353/utq.2006.0227

Emergence and Convergence: Qualitative Novelty and the Unity of Knowledge (review)

2006· article· en· W2042542933 on OpenAlexvenueaboutno aff
Paul Thompson

Bibliographic record

VenueUniversity of Toronto Quarterly · 2006
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicComplex Systems and Decision Making
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsReductionismEpistemologyIlyaNoveltyConvergence (economics)Property (philosophy)SociologyPhilosophy

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Reviewed by: Emergence and Convergence: Qualitative Novelty and the Unity of Knowledge Paul Thompson (bio) Mario Bunge . Emergence and Convergence: Qualitative Novelty and the Unity of KnowledgeUniversity of Toronto Press2003. xiii, 330. $75.00 Early in the twentieth century a consensus developed in science and philosophy of science that ontological emergence (wholes have properties not reducible to, or derivable from, the properties of their parts) is untenable. In the latter part of the twentieth century, dating from the 1960s - around the time Ilya Prigogine's work on non-equilibrium thermodynamic dissipative systems gained prominence - an increasing chorus of scientists and philosophers of science have questioned this consensus. The current debate on emergence as an alternative to reductionism - in particular micro-reductionism - is lively, disciplined, and rooted in contemporary science and the mathematical models used to describe complex, and often non-linear, systems (e.g., atmospheric turbulence). As with most contentious and exciting debates, there is a sense of breaking new ground, but there are also a lot of specious arguments and excessive claims. By contrast with this engaging and far from settled debate, Mario Bunge's book is stale: a return to old arguments and old attitudes. As such, it contributes little to the current debate. Instead, he refuses even to engage [End Page 156] in the debate by defining emergence in a way that empties it of the crucial feature relevant to the current debate. Bunge states: 'My own definition of emergence is this. To say that P is an emergent property of a system of kind K is short for "P is a global [or collective or non-distributive] property of a system of kind K, none of whose components or precursors processes P."' It is not that advocates of ontological emergence reject this feature; they simply consider it to lack the essential feature of meaningful emergence, namely, that P cannot be reduced to, or deduced from, properties of the components or precursors. Bunge summarily dismisses this definition: 'The standard dictionary definition of "emergence" mistakenly identifies it with the impossibility of understanding a whole through an analysis into its components and their interactions' (emphasis added). The dictionary definition, however, captures the way the word has been, and is, used by most people; philosophers distinguish between epistemological and ontological emergence but recognize that the contentious meaning of 'emergence' is ontological emergence. Bunge proffered his definition earlier (1977), but a lot has happened in science and philosophy of science during the almost thirty years since. That he chooses to address a concept of emergence that lacks an essential feature of the concept as currently hotly debated is not surprising. Bunge's views are rooted in a logical empiricist's conception of science, as the following makes clear: 'Some philosophers such as Ernest Nagel (1961) and Carl G. Hempel (1965) have rightly rejected the holist construal of emergence as an ontological category, as being imprecise. They have admitted "emergence" only as an epistemological category equivalent to "unexplainable [or unpredictable] by means of contemporary theories" - the way Broad had proposed.' Nagel and Hempel were central figures in the logical empiricist movement - a movement that, although impressive half a century ago, has been rejected by a majority of philosophers, historians, psychologists, and sociologists of science as well as scientists. It is difficult to comprehend how a book on emergence published in 2003 could fail to take account of the writings of Sunny Auyang. It is also difficult to understand how someone could, anytime after the early 1980s, claim, 'The centrepiece of human socio-biology is its hypothesis of kin selection, according to which we are "designed" by natural selection so as to behave altruistically towards those who share most of our genes with us - that is, our kin, in particular child, parent or sibling.' W.D. Hamilton's concept of inclusive fitness (a concept shaped a decade before E.O. Wilson's Sociobiology: The New Synthesis) allowed a compelling population genetic explanation of biological altruism in organisms like ants and termites - social insects. If human sociobiology has a cornerstone, it is reciprocal altruism, game theory, or mechanisms of culture - gene interaction. These are vastly more important than kin selection (inclusive fitness). There...

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.006
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Review · Consensus signal: Review
Teacher disagreement score0.006
Threshold uncertainty score0.020

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.006
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0020.001
Bibliometrics0.0040.008
Science and technology studies0.0010.002
Scholarly communication0.0040.005
Open science0.0010.002
Research integrity0.0020.003
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0060.002

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.064
GPT teacher head0.358
Teacher spread0.294 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreReview

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

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Citations0
Published2006
Admission routes2
Has abstractyes

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