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Record W2044315104 · doi:10.1109/cec.2009.4983314

An evolutionary random search algorithm for double auction markets

2009· article· en· W2044315104 on OpenAlexaff
Shahram Tabandeh, H. Michalska

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsMcGill University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsDouble auctionComputer sciencePopulationEvolutionary algorithmGenetic algorithmMathematical optimizationAlgorithmArtificial intelligenceMachine learningMathematicsMicroeconomicsCommon value auctionEconomics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

An evolutionary random search algorithm is proposed for learning of the optimum bid in double auction markets where the agents are either members of the population of sellers or the population of buyers. Sellers and buyers are attempting to learn their optimum bid or offer prices, respectively, that maximize their individual gain in the next round of the game. The performance of the algorithm presented in this paper is compared with the performance of the genetic learning algorithm previously used for the same purpose. Multiple simulations demonstrate that the new algorithm converges faster to a market equilibrium. Learning in the presence of uncertainties is also studied.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Other design · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Methods · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.898
Threshold uncertainty score0.999

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0020.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.088
GPT teacher head0.424
Teacher spread0.336 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designOther design
Domainnot available
GenreMethods

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations6
Published2009
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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