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Record W2044641675 · doi:10.1080/13546780500172490

Conditional probability and pragmatic conditionals: Dissociating truth and effectiveness

2006· article· en· W2044641675 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.
aboutThe title or abstract carries a Canadian signal from the geographic lexicon.

Bibliographic record

VenueThinking & Reasoning · 2006
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicDecision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Saskatchewan
Fundersnot available
KeywordsConditional probabilityInferenceRegular conditional probabilityStatement (logic)Conditional expectationConditional independenceLaw of total probabilityMathematicsConditional probability distributionPsychologyEconometricsStatisticsArtificial intelligenceCognitive psychologyComputer scienceRandom variableEpistemologyPosterior probabilityPhilosophyProbability mass function

Abstract

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Abstract Recent research (e.g., Evans & Over, Citation2004) has provided support for the hypothesis that people evaluate the probability of conditional statements of the form if p then q as the conditional probability of q given p, P(q/p). The present paper extends this approach to pragmatic conditionals in the form of inducements (i.e., promises and threats) and advice (i.e., tips and warnings). In so doing, we demonstrate a distinction between the truth status of these conditionals and their effectiveness as speech acts. Specifically, while probability judgements of the truth of conditional inducements and advice are highly correlated with estimates of P(q/p), their perceived effectiveness in changing behaviour instead varies as a function of the conditional probability of q given not-p, P(q/∼p). Finally, we show that the conditional probability approach can be extended to predicting inference rates on a conditional reasoning task. Notes 1Oaksford and colleagues have recently used a similar method of calculating conditional probabilities from estimates of the four truth-table cases to successfully account for performance on another conditional reasoning task, namely the Wason selection task (e.g., Oaksford & Moussakowski, Citation2004; Oaksford & Wakefield, Citation2003). 2For the interested reader, mean inference rates for each conditional statement are presented in Appendix B. This appendix also shows, for each conditional, the four computed conditional probabilities. 3This pattern was obtained when each inference type was analysed separately, except that for both DA and AC, the valence factor was significant while the interaction did not reach significance. 4Indeed, the correlation between P(q/∼p) and behavioural effectiveness for advice (although non-significant) was in the positive direction. This positive correlation was, however, mostly due to one warning conditional; upon removal of this statement, this correlation was close to zero. 5To deal with the possibility of non-linearity, we applied a square root transformation to the truth variable. However, the correlation between behavioural effectiveness and truth ratings remained unchanged after this transformation. Additional informationNotes on contributorsEyvind Ohm The authors gratefully acknowledge an operating grant from Natural Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC). We also would like to thank Jonathan Evans and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.006
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.005
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.335
Threshold uncertainty score0.719

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0060.005
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0010.001
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.041
GPT teacher head0.352
Teacher spread0.311 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it