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Record W2045457657 · doi:10.1109/icc.2014.6883555

Combinatorial spectrum auction with multiple heterogeneous sellers in cognitive radio networks

2014· article· en· W2045457657 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Manitoba
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCognitive radioKnapsack problemCombinatorial auctionComputer scienceSpectrum auctionMathematical optimizationSpectrum (functional analysis)Auction algorithmIncentive compatibilityFrequency allocationGreedy algorithmChannel (broadcasting)PaymentMechanism designIncentiveAuction theoryCommon value auctionComputer networkMathematicsAlgorithmMathematical economicsRevenue equivalenceWirelessMicroeconomicsTelecommunicationsEconomics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Spectrum auction has been considered as an economically incentive way to motivate both primary spectrum owners (POs) and secondary users (SUs) to participate in dynamic spectrum access (DSA). In this paper, we propose a new combinatorial spectrum auction framework for the scenarios that each PO has multiple channels to sell and each SU demands multiple channels. Moreover, the heterogeneity in terms of POs' channel bandwidths and SUs' demands is also considered. The winner determination problem (WDP) in the proposed auction framework can be formulated as a multiple multidimensional knapsack problem (MMKP) and both upper bound and an approximation algorithm with polynomial time are developed. A tailored pricing mechanism is adopted in the payment design to ensure truthfulness and individual rationality. Numerical results show that our proposed auction algorithm can improve the spectrum allocation efficiency compared to counterparts.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: Simulation or modeling
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.581
Threshold uncertainty score0.724

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0010.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.033
GPT teacher head0.307
Teacher spread0.274 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Quick stats

Citations28
Published2014
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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