The Allocational Effects of the Precision of Accounting Estimates
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Analytical model of the allocational effects of accounting estimate precision; accounting theory.
This theoretical paper studies accounting-estimate precision and firm allocation, not research itself.
Accounting/finance theory of estimate precision for capital allocation; not scientific research evaluation.
Abstract
ABSTRACT This paper studies the allocational effects associated with the precision of accounting estimates when the precision of estimates is a choice variable for firms. One part of the paper considers the effects of the observability of precision choices. We show that, generally, making precision choices private increases firms' equilibrium precision choices and also, as a by‐product, their equilibrium investment choices. We further show that, when firms' precision choices are private, there may be a “disclosure trap,” in which, unless investors conjecture the owner has chosen an estimate with the highest possible precision, the owner will respond to investors' conjecture by choosing an estimate whose precision is higher than investors' conjecture. In a multifirm version of the model with endogenous investment, we show that the equilibrium investment by the firm increases in the precision of the firm's own estimate and decreases in the precisions of other firms' estimates. Finally, we show that, in a setting where the firm's initial owner sells his stake in the firm over the course of two periods, with disclosures of estimates of the firm's value occurring prior to each sale of shares, if the precisions of the estimates are public, the equilibrium precisions of the estimates increase over time when the owner sells a sufficiently large fraction of the firm in the first period, and otherwise the equilibrium precisions of estimates remain constant over time.
Stored with the screening record, where it is evidence for the labels above.
The record
- Venue
- Journal of Accounting Research
- Topic
- Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
- Field
- Business, Management and Accounting
- Canadian institutions
- Kellogg's (Canada)
- Funders
- —
- Keywords
- EconomicsInvestment (military)Value (mathematics)EconometricsConjectureMicroeconomicsMathematicsStatistics
- Has abstract in OpenAlex
- yes