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The Allocational Effects of the Precision of Accounting Estimates

2007· article· en· 32 citations· W2048465910 sur OpenAlex· 10.1111/j.1475-679x.2007.00249.x

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strate : aff_core · poids de sondage : 5595.24 (l'échantillon est stratifié ; tout taux calculé sans le poids est faux)
Claude Opus 4.8OUT
genre : conceptual
porte sur le Canada: non
confiance: high

Analytical model of the allocational effects of accounting estimate precision; accounting theory.

GPT-5.6 (high)OUT
genre : conceptual
porte sur le Canada: non
confiance: high

This theoretical paper studies accounting-estimate precision and firm allocation, not research itself.

Grok 4.5OUT
genre : empirical
porte sur le Canada: non
confiance: high

Accounting/finance theory of estimate precision for capital allocation; not scientific research evaluation.

Résumé

ABSTRACT This paper studies the allocational effects associated with the precision of accounting estimates when the precision of estimates is a choice variable for firms. One part of the paper considers the effects of the observability of precision choices. We show that, generally, making precision choices private increases firms' equilibrium precision choices and also, as a by‐product, their equilibrium investment choices. We further show that, when firms' precision choices are private, there may be a “disclosure trap,” in which, unless investors conjecture the owner has chosen an estimate with the highest possible precision, the owner will respond to investors' conjecture by choosing an estimate whose precision is higher than investors' conjecture. In a multifirm version of the model with endogenous investment, we show that the equilibrium investment by the firm increases in the precision of the firm's own estimate and decreases in the precisions of other firms' estimates. Finally, we show that, in a setting where the firm's initial owner sells his stake in the firm over the course of two periods, with disclosures of estimates of the firm's value occurring prior to each sale of shares, if the precisions of the estimates are public, the equilibrium precisions of the estimates increase over time when the owner sells a sufficiently large fraction of the firm in the first period, and otherwise the equilibrium precisions of estimates remain constant over time.

Conservé avec la notice de tri, où il sert de preuve aux étiquettes ci-dessus.

La notice

Revue
Journal of Accounting Research
Thématique
Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
Domaine
Business, Management and Accounting
Établissements canadiens
Kellogg's (Canada)
Organismes subventionnaires
Mots-clés
EconomicsInvestment (military)Value (mathematics)EconometricsConjectureMicroeconomicsMathematicsStatistics
Résumé présent dans OpenAlex
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