MétaCan
Menu
Back to cohort
Record W2048766821 · doi:10.1109/icdsp.2009.5201257

Face recognition with biometric encryption for privacy-enhancing self-exclusion

2009· article· en· W2048766821 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicBiometric Identification and Security
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsBiometricsEncryptionComputer scienceFacial recognition systemInternet privacyComputer securityFace (sociological concept)Information privacyArtificial intelligencePattern recognition (psychology)

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Face recognition has been employed in various security-related applications such as surveillance, mugshot identification, e-passport, and access control. Despite its recent advancements, privacy concern is one of several issues preventing its wider deployment. In this paper, we address the privacy concern for a self-exclusion scenario of face recognition, through combining face recognition with a simple biometric encryption scheme called helper data system. The combined system is described in detail with focus on the key binding procedure. Experiments are carried out on the CMU PIE face database. The experimental results demonstrate that in the proposed system, the biometric encryption module tends to significantly reduce the false acceptance rate while increasing the false rejection rate.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Other design · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Methods · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.969
Threshold uncertainty score0.334

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.004
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.026
GPT teacher head0.258
Teacher spread0.232 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Quick stats

Citations55
Published2009
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

Explore more

Same topicBiometric Identification and SecurityFrench-language works237,207