How the Cold War Began: The Igor Gouzenko Affair and the Hunt for Soviet Spies (review)

Reviewed by: How the Cold War Began: The Gouzenko Affair and the Hunt for Soviet Spies Lawrence Aronsen (bio) Amy Knight. How the Cold War Began: The Gouzenko Affair and the Hunt for Soviet Spies McClelland and Stewart. ix, 358. $36.99 In early September 1945, Igor Gouzenko, a Soviet cipher clerk stationed in Ottawa, fled the Soviet Embassy bringing with him documents indicating the presence of an extensive espionage ring operating throughout North America. Amy Knight recounts in riveting detail his escape and then discusses the response of the Canadian, American, and British governments to this information. The real story of what happened is far from the good vs evil story depicted in the movie on the Gouzenko affair, The Iron Curtain. The author is particularly concerned to demonstrate Gouzenko's character flaws, the limitations of the Canadian justice system, and how American anti-communists used the espionage incident for their own political and bureaucratic purposes. How the Cold War Began provides fresh information on Igor Gouzenko's motives for stealing the documents and seeking asylum, suggesting that a calculation of personal gain rather than larger objectives about warning the 'free world' about its totalitarian ally was paramount. Looking at Gouzenko's behaviour after he was granted asylum, the mismanagement of his financial affairs, his difficult personality, and general failure to adapt to a free society certainly complicates the story. While the author acknowledges there was an extensive espionage network, she downplays the importance of the information passed on. Perhaps the most damaging were the secrets Canadian scientist Raymond Boyer gave to Soviets related to the chemical explosive rdx. As for the atomic bomb, the British scientist Alan Nunn May was able to acquire a small sample of refined uranium in Canada which ended up in Soviet hands. In the end, however, most of the information could have been obtained legally through various wartime military sharing agreements such as the Mutual Aid Program. Amy Knight is particularly critical of the Canadian government's inattention to due process and the rule of law during the detainment and interrogation of the suspects identified by Gouzenko. Without access to lawyers a few of the spies confessed, but there was no evidence of physical torture. However, when brought before a court of law, less than half of the espionage suspects were found guilty even though it is likely that all of them were in violation of the Official Secrets Act. Much of the blame for the heavy-handedness of Canada's internal security bureaucracy can be traced to the rcmp and Prime Minister King's closest advisor Norman Robertson. There is much new information here on intelligence relations between the three North Atlantic allies. Regarding the presence of a spy network in Britain, Gouzenko mentioned the presence of a Soviet agent 'Elli' but was rather vague on specific information. The British sent over their own spymaster, Peter Dwyer, to Ottawa for an interview but he left unimpressed with Gouzenko's motives. More troubling was that 'Elli' (Kim Philby), a Soviet agent working within mi 6, effectively sidetracked the British from acting on the Gouzenko information. [End Page 601] The Gouzenko revelations also had implications for the American efforts to counteract Soviet espionage at home. In his interview with the rcmp, the Soviet defector made reference to a high-placed official in the United States Department of State but did not specifically mention the name, Alger Hiss. The author notes that fbi director J. Edgar Hoover quickly seized this questionable information to implicate Hiss, whose innocence is still under debate. Moreover, the Venona transcripts (intercepts of Soviet diplomatic correspondence), which some historians have used to confirm Hiss's guilt, are open to interpretation. To substantiate this point, reference is made to the Hiss lawyer Mark Lowenthal's academic research on the Venona transcripts. But Eduard Mark has demonstrated that Venona document 1822 has been deliberately misread by Lowenthal and that other documents corroborating Hiss as a spy (document 195) have been overlooked. The recent biography of Hiss by Edward White provides the most up-to-date case against Hiss's complicity. In her search for balance the author may be off course here. In...

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