Pay Systems and Organizational Flexibility
Why this work is in the frame
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Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract This paper argues that the type of pay system utilized by an organization can either facilitate or hinder its ability to achieve structural flexibility. It contends that pay systems that include group‐based pay will facilitate structural flexibility, while pay systems based primarily on time worked, seniority, or individual performance will hinder structural flexibility. Analysis of data from a sample of Canadian manufacturing organizations showed a significant positive relationship between group pay and flexibility, and a significant negative relationship between time‐based pay and flexibility. However, the expected negative relationship between seniority and flexibility fell slightly short of statistical significance, while no relationship was found between individual performance pay and flexibility. Résumé Cette étude démontre que le régime salarial d'un organisation peut favoriser autant que nuire à la flexibilité de sa structure organisationelle. L'étude affirme qu'un régime de salaires qui inclut une division des salaires par blocs d'employés peut encourager la flexibilité de l'organisation, tandis que les régimes qui reconnaissent plutôt le nombre d'heures travaillées, l'ancienneté ou la productivité individuelle nuisent à cette même flexibilité. L'analyse de données provenant d'un échantillonage de fabricants canadiens démontre une relation très favorable entre un régime salarial par blocs d'employés et la flexibilité de l'organisation, et une forte corrélation négative entre un régime salrial fondé sur le nombre d'heures travaillés et la flexibilité. Toutefois, malgré les attentes de l'auteur, une même corrélation négative entre l'ancienneté et la flexibilité ne trouve pas de confirmation statistique significative, tandis qu'aucun lien n'apu être démontré entre la flexibilité d'une organisation et un régime salarial fondé sur la productivité individuelle.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.004 | 0.002 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it