Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy (review)

Reviewed by: Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy Bernd Horn Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy. Terry Copp. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003. Pp. xv, 348 , illus. $40.00 Challenging the established order of things is never easy. It is a daunting and frustrating task. Rarely is such courage rewarded. Too often, the pioneering work of some becomes the conventional wisdom upon which subsequent efforts are built. With each work that follows, the chimera of truth and/or accuracy becomes more difficult to contest. Yet this is precisely the task that Terry Copp undertakes. And this is also the essence and importance of his latest work. He provides a completely different interpretation of the Canadian military performance in Normandy in 1944. Copp's challenge is not without risk. In his endeavour to provide an alternative view, he has taken on giants such as Chester Wilmot, C.P. Stacey, and S.L.A. Marshall, as well as more contemporary historians such as Martin van Crevald, Trevor Dupuy, John English, and Max Hastings. But Copp is no neophyte himself. He comes to his latest work with extensive experience and background. One need only consider his books such as the Maple Leaf Route series, Battle Exhaustion: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Canadian Army 1939-45, and The Brigade: The Fifth Canadian Infantry Brigade, 1939-45, and the myriad other publications he has authored, to comprehend his expertise. These projects, combined with extensive interviews with veterans and comprehensive research, provide him with insight and detailed knowledge to produce a critical assessment of the topic. The book does not dawdle. It explodes in the first few pages as he takes on the established order by challenging what he calls the myth of the ineffective Allied soldiers in Normandy - more precisely, the belief that only 'numerical and material superiority' allowed success against the vastly superior German soldier. More to the point, he disagrees with the accusation that the Canadian soldier was 'no match for the battle experienced German troops.' Quite simply, Copp contests the notion that somehow Canadians and Allied soldiers failed to effectively benefit from their training and that Canadians were poorly trained, badly led, and slow to learn. In an important but fascinating exploration, Copp traces back to the root of the myth, from early, influential historians such as Chester Wilmot and C.P. Stacey, as well as others, to the post-war opinion in NATO that the 'superiority of the German Army and especially the [Waffen] ss became an article of faith.' Copp then tackles the myth head-on and makes the case that the achievement of the Allied armies in Normandy [End Page 569] has been greatly underrated, while conversely, the effectiveness of the Germans has been greatly exaggerated. As he points out, the Allied soldiers, employing flexible and innovative operational and tactical solutions to challenging hurdles, defeated two German Armies in just seventy-six days. And more specifically, Copp argues that although the Canadians' performance at the tactical and operational level was far from perfect, their achievements were out of all proportion to the number of troops involved. In essence, he contends that their performance compares favourably with that of any other army in Normandy: the Canadians and the rest of 21 Army Group fought a highly successful campaign that required flexibility and improvisation. Copp defends his interpretation by rooting his analysis of the Canadian experience and performance in the examination of the actual message logs, unit and formation war diaries, official historical officer interviews after events, written orders, and his own intimate knowledge of the terrain. Predictably, he begins with D-Day and the Normandy invasion. His narrative is swift and effective. He very ably describes the success of the first few hours of the invasion for the Canadians - accomplished, as he points out, despite the absence of effective naval or aerial fire support. It was the Canadian engineer, infantry, and armoured forces that punched a hole in the German defence through courage and their own direct fire. Copp does not try to avoid confrontation. Rather, he tackles the conventional wisdom that Canadians failed to exploit the situation and seize Caen and the original D-Day objectives...

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.