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Record W2068188069 · doi:10.1353/jmh.2004.0222

Alaska's Hidden Wars: Secret Campaigns on the North Pacific Rim (review)

2004· article· en· W2068188069 on OpenAlex
Galen Roger Perras

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

aboutThe title or abstract carries a Canadian signal from the geographic lexicon.
no affNo Canadian affiliation: this work is invisible to an affiliation-only frame.
No Canadian affiliation. An affiliation-only frame, the usual design, would never have seen this work. It is one of the works that make the case for inverting the frame.

Bibliographic record

VenueThe Journal of Military History · 2004
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicArctic and Russian Policy Studies
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsOfficerHistoryWorld War IISubject (documents)Spanish Civil WarIndex (typography)Library scienceArchaeologyComputer science

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Reviewed by: Alaska’s Hidden Wars: Secret Campaigns on the North Pacific Rim Galen Roger Perras Alaska’s Hidden Wars: Secret Campaigns on the North Pacific Rim. By Otis Hays, Jr. Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press, 2004. ISBN 1-889963-64-X. Maps. Photographs. Appendixes. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xvii, 182. $19.95. Otis Hays, Jr. is a familiar name among academics and general readers with a more than passing knowledge of and interest in the historiography of the conflict in the North Pacific during World War II. A former intelligence officer in Alaska during the war, Hays has written extensively on the subject of Alaskan defense, including two well-received books on the aerial connections between Alaska and Siberia from 1942 to 1945. In this latest short monograph, Hays thus returns to very familiar ground, though unfortunately with decidedly mixed results. One of the book's major problems lies in its episodic and sometimes disjointed framework. Hays seeks to give the reader a veritable smorgasbord of subjects loosely divided into two broad sections: the Aleutian Islands campaign of 1942-43; and operations in the Kurile Islands from 1943 until 1945. Therefore the reader is given the chance to become acquainted with a series of subtopics, including aerial operations in the Aleutians, deception campaigns, censorship, the bitter experience of an American-trained Japanese [End Page 1288] military doctor who met his death on Attu in May 1943, and the use of Japanese-American Nissei interpreters and intelligence operatives by American forces in the landings on Attu and Kiska in 1943. In the case of the Nissei, Hays does a good job, using original intelligence documents, interviews conducted with surviving Nissei, and well-chosen photographs to tell a most interesting story of a hitherto little known episode. Much of the rest of the book does not live up to the Nissei standard. By seeking to cover so many topics in relatively few pages, the book gives the reader more of a fleeting taste than a truly satisfying and filling meal. For example, the too short chapter on American plans to deceive the Japanese about possible operations against the Kurile Islands does little to illuminate a most complex subject. Hays relies too much on a limited set of primary documents produced within Alaskan Defense Command itself rather than on the vast record sets produced by the various American command organizations in the wider Pacific Theater and in Washington, D.C. There is no mention of Admiral Robert Theobald's unrealized plans, as early as 1942, to mount a deception scheme in the Aleutians. Further, the excellent work on American deception plans in the Pacific conflict by Katherine Herbig is not cited. Hays also does little to explain the attempts by such luminaries as Generals Simon Buckner, John DeWitt, Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, and various other planners and staff officers to mount a massive invasion of the Kuriles in late 1944 or early 1945. Such an attack would have been no small effort. In late 1943 Buckner lobbied for an expeditionary force of nine divisions (plus 18,000 corps troops), three aircraft carrier task forces, and hundreds of combat aircraft to force a decisive war-winning confrontation with Japan on its northern approaches. This plan, and numerous others, foundered upon two virtually unmovable shoals: the Soviet Union's consistent refusal to enter the war against Japan until after Germany's destruction; and the refusal of the senior levels of the American military command system, personified by General George C. Marshall, to countenance such a risky effort for fear it would have disrupted not only American plans for the entire Pacific Theater, but also the global Allied war effort. In the end, Hays and his readers would have been better served had he winnowed down the number of topics, giving him the time and space to explore what remained in more satisfying detail. Finally, a correction. Hays mentions that the "Canadian Grenadiers" were given an American Nissei interpreter. The unit, in fact, was the "Winnipeg Grenadiers." Galen Roger Perras Ottawa, Ontario, Canada Copyright © 2004 Society for Military History

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: Not applicable
GenreCandidate signal: Review · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.534
Threshold uncertainty score0.615

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0010.001
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.033
GPT teacher head0.266
Teacher spread0.234 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it