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Record W2070548619 · doi:10.1109/hicss.2013.183

Does It Pay Off to Bid Aggressively? An Empirical Study

2013· article· en· W2070548619 on OpenAlexaff
Philipp Herrmann, Dennis Kundisch, Md. Shafiur Rahman

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Calgary
Fundersnot available
KeywordsBiddingAuction theoryCommon value auctionMicroeconomicsVickrey–Clarke–Groves auctionEauctionEnglish auctionVickrey auctionProxy bidUnique bid auctionEmpirical researchRevenue equivalenceCompetitor analysisBusinessComputer scienceEconomicsMarketingStatisticsMathematics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

We empirically investigate the payoff of signaling through aggressiveness in an online auction. To address our research question, we use a unique and very rich dataset containing actual market transaction data for approximately 7,000 pay-per-bid auctions. Our research design allows us to isolate the impact of aggressive bidding, used in an attempt to signal a high valuation to deter other auction participants, on the probability of winning an auction. We analyze more than 600,000 bids placed manually by approximately 2,600 distinct auction participants. We find a strong and significant positive effect of aggressive bidding on the total number of bids placed, and on the total number of participants in an auction. The strong and significantly negative effect of aggressive bidding on the individual probability of winning an auction supports the finding that aggressive bidding is ineffective as a strategy for deterring competitors in an online auction.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: Not applicable
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.405
Threshold uncertainty score0.983

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0190.018

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.117
GPT teacher head0.462
Teacher spread0.345 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; both teacher heads agree on what is shown here.

Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2013
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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