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A Theory of Favoritism in an International Oligopoly*

2006· article· en· W2071602789 on OpenAlexaff
Ngo Van Long, Antoine Soubeyran

Bibliographic record

VenueReview of International Economics · 2006
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicMerger and Competition Analysis
Canadian institutionsMcGill University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsOligopolyEconomicsDistribution (mathematics)Government (linguistics)MicroeconomicsBenchmark (surveying)Neoclassical economicsCournot competition

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Abstract This paper offers an explanation of the fact that some foreign firms are favored at the expense of others, and characterizes the distribution of favors in terms of the cost parameters of firms. We present a model where favors must be bought: they come from competing contributions. This model is compared with a benchmark model with a benevolent government. We show how the distribution of favors in the favor‐seeking model deviates from the distribution that would be obtained if the government were really benevolent.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.006
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.016
Threshold uncertainty score0.052

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.006
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.004
Scholarly communication0.0040.003
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0010.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0160.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.019
GPT teacher head0.248
Teacher spread0.229 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations5
Published2006
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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