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Record W2076195851 · doi:10.2202/1935-1704.1417

Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds

2008· article· en· W2076195851 on OpenAlexaff
René Kirkegaard

Bibliographic record

VenueThe B E Journal of Theoretical Economics · 2008
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsBrock University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsComparative staticsMicroeconomicsCommon value auctionEconomicsStochastic gameVickrey auctionPreemptionRevenueWelfareSet (abstract data type)Mathematical economicsAuction theoryComputer scienceFinance

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Comparative statics for all-pay auctions with two heterogeneous and privately informed bidders are analyzed. General results are provided for when one bidder becomes stochastically weaker. The comparative statics are fully characterized for truncations. Moreover, we show that expected revenue may increase when one bidder weakens. In the second part of the paper we consider a dynamic contest in which beliefs change endogenously: the first bidder may preempt the auction by paying a bribe. An all-pay auction is held if the bribe is not paid, in which case the second bidder revises his beliefs. With the option to bribe, expected payoff decreases for a set of types of at least one bidder, possibly the bidder ostensibly advantaged by the preemption option. However, the expected revenue and the ex ante payoff of both bidders may improve.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.010
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.033
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.012
Threshold uncertainty score0.055

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0100.033
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0020.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0030.002
Bibliometrics0.0030.002
Science and technology studies0.0020.005
Scholarly communication0.0090.011
Open science0.0020.003
Research integrity0.0040.003
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0120.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.078
GPT teacher head0.335
Teacher spread0.258 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations9
Published2008
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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Same venueThe B E Journal of Theoretical EconomicsSame topicAuction Theory and ApplicationsFrench-language works237,207