MétaCan
Menu
Back to cohort
Record W2081504411 · doi:10.1353/crv.2006.0003

Uncontainable Metaphor: George F. Kennan's "X" Article and Cold War Discourse

2005· article· en· W2081504411 on OpenAlexvenueno aff
Brian Diemert

Bibliographic record

VenueCanadian Review of American Studies · 2005
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldArts and Humanities
TopicRhetoric and Communication Studies
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsMetaphorObject (grammar)Meaning (existential)George (robot)PhilosophyLiteratureContradictionInterpretation (philosophy)Literal and figurative languageEvent (particle physics)Conceptual metaphorEpistemologyLinguisticsHistoryArtArt history

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Uncontainable Metaphor:George F. Kennan's "X" Article and Cold War Discourse1 Brian Diemert (bio) "Unless you are at home in the metaphor, unless you have had your proper poetical education in the metaphor, you are not safe anywhere" Robert Frost (39) "... the development of civilizations is essentially a progress ion of metaphors" E. L. Doctorow (164) Emerson wrote, "Every word which is used to express a moral and intellectual fact, if traced to its root, is found to be borrowed from some material appearance" ("Nature" 911), so every word is a metaphor. Emerson repudiated those such as Hobbes and Locke, who saw metaphor as largely ornamental, and so incompatible with reason2 to embrace the idea that language was radically metaphorical, saturated with figurative meaning. Yet one does not have to subscribe wholly to his perspective to recognize that metaphor enables us to formulate concepts and to map, "what is known about one domain onto a less structured domain" (Chilton 48). George Lakoff recognized long ago that metaphor has a cognitive dimension. It allows us to make sense of a complex world by letting us conceive of the world in terms structured according to pre-conceptual experiences derived from our having bodies that stand erect, move through space, feel sensation, and are separate from each other (14–7; 56). We might again turn to Emerson, who described "man [as] an analogist" ("Nature" 911): we can understand a particular object, event, or idea because it is like another object, event, or idea—a notion that recalls Kenneth Burke's point [End Page 21] that metaphor "brings out the thisness of a that, or the thatness of a this" (503).3 The problem, however, is that "this" is not "that," so there is always "deviance" or "incongruity" in metaphor, as there is in analogy (Burke 504). Two things may be analogous, but they are not homologous, so our reliance on metaphoric structure and on analogy creates distortions and misunderstandings because metaphor, as classical rhetoricians recognized, "allows the speaker to slip in other propositions without scrutiny" (Nogales 6). Metaphor causes us to undertake a "reconceptualization," in Noga-les's formulation, as we re-conceive of relationships between terms to privilege certain traits while devaluing others (9–10ff). That is, the appearance of metaphor compels us to determine which of the many possible qualities associated with an object or trait is or is not applicable in a given construction. In Nogales's example, to say "Jack is a 'bully"' is very different from saying "Jack is a 'sheepdog."' Both metaphors may be used to describe a tendency to dominate others because one's associations with "bully" or "sheepdog" are likely to be very different (1–2ff). The metaphors one chooses to use have an emotive content that can fundamentally alter our understanding of a situation. Consequently, metaphors also help generate meaning. And, of course, the emotive power of metaphor allows memorable figures, turns of speech, phrase, and image to linger in our minds long after we read or hear an account. Metaphor is particularly potent as a persuasive tool, as well as a cognitive process, because it can mask or at least alter our memory of the content. Metaphor belongs to both the realm of semantics and ornamentation and the realm of cognition and pragmatics. And the shape it gives our thoughts is crucial in the determination of how we act and respond in the world. Wayne Booth notes that persuasive metaphors, what he calls "weapon metaphors," demand a new understanding of the words' meanings. The auditor or reader must reconstruct "acceptable meanings, [but] they are not ... separated from the stated meanings and then in some sense repudiated ... the original meaning, what might be called the uninterpreted picture, remains as part of the final picture" (Booth 53). Metaphor is a shaping force in our construction of reality: it may even come to be seen as reality. "It is this way with all of us concerning language," Nietzsche wrote, "we believe we know something about the things themselves when we speak of trees, colors, snow, and flowers; and yet we possess nothing but metaphors for things ..." (890–1). Consequently, as Wittgenstein famously wrote, "the...

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.003
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.003
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.065
Threshold uncertainty score0.128

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0030.003
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0020.002
Science and technology studies0.0120.026
Scholarly communication0.0060.007
Open science0.0010.003
Research integrity0.0070.008
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0040.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.033
GPT teacher head0.296
Teacher spread0.263 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations2
Published2005
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

Explore more

Same venueCanadian Review of American StudiesSame topicRhetoric and Communication StudiesFrench-language works237,207