Canada, NORAD, and the Evolution of Strategic Defence

Canada proved to be reliable and cooperative partner of the Americans on variety of air defence initiatives in the early Cold War. Both countries constructed dense network of radar lines, prioritized their respective air defence forces, and eventually agreed to binational North American Air Defence Command (NORAD), imbued with the operational control of both countries' air defence forces. However, Canada's role in strategic defence was just as quickly challenged by the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. NORAD's raison d'etre shifted to the early warning and tracking of these long-range delivery systems, even as Washington became increasingly infatuated with the potential of missile defences from the late 1960s onward. Importantly, Canada consistently refrained from cooperating with the United States on strategic missile defence.At first glance, there is curious disjunction between how Canada was so cooperative when the bete noir was the Soviet nuclear-armed bomber but became intransigent when the United States contemplated active defences against ballistic missiles. However, one should also not overlook the long-term consistency in Canadian policy choices on strategic defence - cooperation on air defence entailed some serious reservations and conditions, while non-participation on missile defence was consistently offset by supportive behaviour. This reveals some important limits on how Canada is able to cooperate with the Americans and the degree to which it is able to disagree with them on strategic policy. It also provides clues on the likelihood that Canada could revisit its decision on missile defence and the conditions required for such policy change to take place.CANADA'S DILEMMA WITH AIR DEFENCEBy the late 1940s, the Soviet Union revealed an intercontinental bomber that could be armed with atomic gravity bombs. This created the possibility of direct atomic strikes against the continent using Canadian air corridors. As John Foster Dulles acknowledged, Canada's territory suddenly became a very important piece of real estate.1 Yet Ottawa was initially hesitant on the requirement for strategic defences against the air-breathing bomber threat. Senior military officials envisioned any Soviet attack on North America to be largely in nature. Given the ambitious radar proposals being put forward by the Canada-US military cooperation committee and US Air Force, they were equally concerned at the prospective cost of any air defence system.Yet Ottawa still agreed to activate fighter aircraft squadrons and form an air defence group (renamed command in 1951). It also approved the $5-billion accelerated defence program after the Korean War to rearm the Canadian forces, with the fledgling air defence forces key recipient. Indeed, rather than being seen only as diversionary tactic, defence planners in Ottawa seemed to accept the possibility that the Soviets might launch direct attack on the population centres and industrial targets of North America. In that regard, Canada's perception of Soviet bomber threat paralleled the growing American anxiety over its own vulnerability, as shown by the US construction of rudimentary early warning capability (the permanent radar network) and the growing resources allocated to US air defence command. Officials also understood that Canadian territory offered modicum of strategic depth against the Soviet bomber threat.2Canada remained sensitive that cooperation on strategic defence could lead to American forces being deployed on Canadian territory. True, it did agree to the joint construction and shared costs of the Pinetree line radar extension finally completed in 1954. But Ottawa also obtained number of assurances on Canada's involvement in and control over these radar stations that helped safeguard the country's sense of sovereignty.3 Meanwhile, the US Air Force (USAF) had strong incentive to undertake cross-border interceptions, which even Canada found attractive due to the country's limited number of fighter aircraft and interest in pushing any interception away from its populated areas. …

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