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Record W2084450010 · doi:10.1049/iet-ifs.2014.0337

Hijacking the Vuze BitTorrent network: all your hop are belong to us

2014· article· en· W2084450010 on OpenAlexaff
Eric Chan‐Tin, Victor Heorhiadi, Nicholas Hopper, Yongdae Kim

Bibliographic record

VenueIET Information Security · 2014
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicPeer-to-Peer Network Technologies
Canadian institutionsStillwater (Canada)
Fundersnot available
KeywordsBitTorrentComputer scienceComputer networkSet (abstract data type)File sharingTheoretical computer scienceComputer securityInformation retrievalPeer-to-peerWorld Wide WebThe Internet

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Vuze is a popular file‐sharing client. When looking for content, Vuze selects from its list of neighbours, a set of 20 nodes to be contacted; the selection is performed such that the neighbours closest to the content in terms of Vuze ID are contacted first. To improve efficiency of its searches, Vuze implements a network coordinate system: from the set of 20 to‐be‐contacted nodes, queries are sent to the closest nodes in terms of network distance, which is calculated by the difference in network coordinates. However, network coordinate systems are inherently insecure and a malicious peer can lie about its coordinate to appear closest to every peer in the network. This allows the malicious peer to bias next‐hop choices for victim peers such that queries will be sent to the attacker, thus hijacking every search query. In our experiments, almost 20% of the search queries are hijacked; the cost of performing this attack is minimal – less than $112/month.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.009
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.004
Threshold uncertainty score0.009

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.009
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.001
Scholarly communication0.0010.004
Open science0.0010.003
Research integrity0.0010.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0020.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.019
GPT teacher head0.253
Teacher spread0.234 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designSimulation or modeling
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations2
Published2014
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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