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Record W2089407899 · doi:10.1145/2790798.2790803

User Agent and Privacy Compromise

2008· article· en· W2089407899 on OpenAlexaff
Bipin C. Desai

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicPrivacy, Security, and Data Protection
Canadian institutionsConcordia University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsComputer scienceCompromiseThe InternetMultitudeWorld Wide WebInternet privacyEncryptionPrivacy softwareUser interfaceComputer securityInformation privacy

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

World Wide Web and the graphic user agents(web browsers) have brought the internet to billions of new users who use it hours on end daily to perform a multitude of tasks. However, the user agents also provide a means to compromise the users privacy by employing various tracking mechanisms and use of analytics. The browser was intended to make the use of the internet easy with a simple and intuitive interface. It has morphed into a beast which has hidden in it mechanisms to allow suppliers of information content, on-line shopping companies and multitude of third parties to target publicity based on information gleaned from previous web journeys of users of these browsers. This paper focuses on summarizing privacy problems on the client side and highlights the default settings of some of the popular browsers and points out the difficulty of creating the proper settings even to disable cookies from third parties. We present some independent add-ons to help in preserving some privacy and some of the drawbacks of such band-aid solutions. Finally, we present some suggestions so that the user can know exactly what is being recorded in the cookies based on double encryption giving back some control to the user of his own data.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.023
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.062
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Other · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.023
Threshold uncertainty score0.121

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0230.062
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.002
Bibliometrics0.0020.002
Science and technology studies0.0060.009
Scholarly communication0.0110.020
Open science0.0030.010
Research integrity0.0120.010
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0080.002

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.053
GPT teacher head0.306
Teacher spread0.253 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreOther

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations2
Published2008
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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