The Unity of Efficient and Final Causality: The Mind/Body Problem Reconsidered

Abstract In this paper, I argue that it is in the fourteenth century that the problem of the compatibility or unity of efficient and final causality emerges. William Ockham and John Buridan start to flirt with a mechanized view of nature solely explainable by efficient causality, and they hence push final causality into the human mind and use it to explain for example action, morality and the good. Their argumentation introduces the problem of how to give a unified account of the world, that is, how are nature and freedom compatible. In the paper, I set up the discussion by going through some of the problems associated with final causality in the seventeenth century and show that Ockham and Buridan's problems are similar. I then argue using a formulation from Leibniz's Monadology that the problems here traced should be seen as versions of the mind/body problem. Keywords: Mind/body problemefficient causalityfinal causalityOckhamBuridanDescartesSpinozaLeibniz Notes 1I cannot here give a fair account of the early modern debate about final causality, since that is the topic of a larger book. I am foremost concerned with pointing out the origin of a problem, and arguing for the existence of a problem. For treatments of early modern views of final causality, particularly Cartesian, see Des Chene, Physiologia: Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought, and Schmaltz, Descartes on Causation. 2See Descartes, Oeuvres de Descartes, II 665–6 (from now on AT); and Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: The Correspondence, 218 (from now on CSMK). 3See the clarifying discussion in Shapiro, The Correspondence Between Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes, 23–4. 4See Aristotle, Physics II.8 for his defence of final causes in nature. As far as I know, Aristotle himself never uses this kind of terminology. 5See Alanen, Descartes's Concept of Mind for a discussion about the importance of the correspondence with Elisabeth for Descartes's later thinking. In the correspondence with Elisabeth, Descartes somewhat mysteriously says that even though the Scholastics were misguided about their account of heavy bodies that same account is correct if applied to the mind/body interaction. See Shapiro, The Correspondence Between Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes, 24. 6For the translation see Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, II 39 (from now on CSM). For an interesting exchange about final cause see Gassendi's objection (AT VII 309; CSM II 215) and Descartes's reply (AT VII 375; CSM II 258). For a similar view of final causality in physics see Principles of Philosophy (AT VIIIA 16 and 81; CSM I 202 and 248). 7See Rutherford, ‘Descartes' Ethics’, and the correspondence with Elisabeth in Shapiro, The Correspondence Between Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes and the discussion about the final end of human action. CSMK 261ff. See also Davis, Descartes: Belief, Scepticism and Virtue, 124–7, for a discussion of the teleological structure of Descartes's ethics. 8See Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics, Chapter 9, for the standard interpretation and see Garrett, ‘Teleology in Spinoza and Early Modern Rationalism’ for an opposing view. 9See Pasnau, ‘Intentionality and Final Causes’, 301. 10At least as far as Aristotle is concerned, it is quite possible that the problem Spinoza points to is a pseudo-problem and rests on a misunderstanding of what a final cause is. This seems to be M. Frede's view. In ‘The Original Notion of Cause’, he writes that: ‘there is a strong tendency to conceive of causes as somehow active. And it seems that our difficulty with the Aristotelian causes is due to the fact that they cannot even be conceived of in this way. A good part of the unfortunate history of the notion of a final cause has its origin in the assumption that the final cause, as a cause, must act and in the vain attempt to explain how it could be so’ (125–6). Even if Frede is right, I think it became standard to think about a final cause as Spinoza does after Ockham. It is perhaps a consequence of the mechanization of nature and the story told in this paper. 11My outline of Leibniz above is much indebted to Bennett, ‘Leibniz's Two Realms’. The conflict between efficient and final causality becomes greatly emphasized within German philosophy from Kant onwards. In his third Critique, Kant calls this problem the Antinomy of Teleological Judgment. It involves two maxims (sect. 70ff.): ‘The first maxim of judgment is this thesis: All production of material things and their forms must be judged to be possible in terms of merely mechanical laws. The second maxim is this antithesis: Some products of material nature cannot be judged to be possible in terms of merely mechanical laws (judging them requires a quite different causal law – viz. that of final causes)’ (Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, AA 5.387). The resolution of this antinomy is in sect. 78. 12For the locus classicus of scholarly discussions of final causality in later medieval natural philosophy see Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe der spätscholastischen Naturphilosophie, 273–335. For a more recent and shorter discussion, although equally interesting, see Pasnau, ‘Intentionality and Final Causes’. 13See Goddu, The Physics of William Ockham and Adams, ‘Ockham on Final Causality’ for careful discussions of Ockham on final causality. 14See Lagerlund, ‘John Buridan and the Problem of Dualism in Early Fourteenth Century Philosophy’ for an outline of Ockham's mind/body dualism. 15Pasnau, ‘Intentionality and Final Causes’, 313–15. Pasnau's argument rests on a text from the little known work called Quaestiones variae. In question 4, Ockham writes that (Pasnau's translation): [a]n end's moving an agent to act is an end's being loved and the agent's acting for the sake of that end, as loved. But an end is loved by an agent in virtue of its reality outside the soul and the agent acts for the love of that end as it is external. For walking is not for the sake of health as it has existence in the soul alone, not because I love health or life in virtue of its existence in the soul, but because I live health and life in virtue of its real being outside the soul. And it is for the sake of such loved being that I walk and abstain and do such things(Opera theologica VIII 115). In this text, Ockham seems to say that the end is both internal and external, but it is for the sake of the external end we act. The context of this quote is a discussion about Averroes's and Avicenna's views about final causes and it is thus unclear whether Ockham himself is committed to this view. Particularly, since just before the text quoted by Pasnau he writes that: ‘I therefore say that the final cause as that which moves the agent is not required to have existence in external reality, but it suffices that it is in the soul’ (Opera theologica VIII 114). He maintains, however, in the conclusion that: ‘I therefore say that it is the end in accordance with its reality outside the soul that moves the agent to act’ (Opera theologica VIII 116). He then moves to an explanation of why this does not commit him to positing non-existing entities. What Ockham says here is strange and his final position is unclear. I lean towards M. M. Adams's conclusion that Ockham's view of final causality is inconsistent (Adams, ‘Ockham on Final Causality’), although perhaps for different reasons than hers. 16The best discussion of Buridan on final causality is still Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe der spätscholastischen Naturphilosophie, 300–35. Buridan is the first thinker in history to equate ends with intentions. He was so influential that, as we have seen, it does not even make sense by Descartes's time to talk about ends in nature, since that implies that there are small rational souls attached to material bodies intending the direction they are moving in. 17Buridan, Quaestiones super octo Physicorum libros Aristotelis, II, q. 7, fol. xxxvra: ‘… omnis causa est prior naturaliter causato … /…/ finis autem non est prior naturaliter …’ 18Buridan, Quaestiones super octo Physicorum libros Aristotelis, II, q. 7, fol. xxxvra: Item sicut medicus per suas medicamentas et per suas operationes intendit generare sanitatem ita Deus et intelligentie per corpora celestia et motus eorum intendunt generationes istorum inferiorum ut debet videri duodecimo metaphysice ergo si propter pro dicta diceremus sanitatem illam esse causa medici et medicinarum et suam operationum ita deberemus dicere hec inferiora esse causas Dei et intelligentiarum et celi et motuum celestium sed hec apparent inconvenientia, … 19Buridan, Quaestiones super octo Physicorum libros Aristotelis, II, q. 7, fol. xxxvra-b: Videtur mihi quod omnes instinctu naturali tamquam a natura determinati concedunt finem esse causam nostrarum operationum, ut si etas a vetula propter quam causam vadit ad ecclesiam vel ad forum dicit tibi quod propter audire missam vel propter emere tunicam, et si queritur a te propter quam causam vadis ad scolas respondebis propter addiscere. Talia autem qua sic ab omnibus conceduntur non debent omnino negari quia ad oppositum probandum non posset aliquid probabilius et magis confessum adduci sicut dicit Aristoteles septio Ethicorum. 20Ibid., II, q. 7, fol. xxxvrb: Propter hoc ergo notandum est quod sicut sanum dicitur multipliciter et non una intentione, aliter enim animal dicitur sanum aliter urina aliter cibus. Ita causa etiam in utroquae quattuor generum cause dicitur multipliciter et nunc specialiter de fine. Finis enim dicitur alius quo alius gratia cuius, operationis vel generationis, alius rei operate vel genite et ut dicit commentator secundo Celi, alius dicitur finis prima intentione et alius secunda intentione. 21Pasnau, ‘Intentionality and Final Causes’, 316, and Lagerlund, ‘Buridan's Theory of Free Choice and Its Influence’, 176. 22Buridan, Quaestiones super decem libros Ethicorum Aristoteles ad Nicomachum, X, q. 2, fol. ccvrb: Libertate finalis ordinationis dicitur agens libere agere si agat suiipsius gratia principali intentione, et serviliter si gratia alterius. Unde sic solus deus agit simpliciter et omnino libere; omnia autem alia agentia in ordine ad ipsum deum agunt serviliter, quia omnia que sunt et agunt et sunt et agunt gratia ipsius dei; unde et nos debemus esse servi dei. Deus autem quicquid ad extra producit vel conservat ipse producit et conservat suiipsius gratia prima et principali intentione; omnia enim que sunt in ipsum deum finaliter ordinata sunt. Et tamen hoc non obstante agens particulare dicitur agere libere si agat suiipsius gratia magis principaliter quam gratia alicuius alterius finis particularis qui non contineat ipsum finaliter secundum naturalem finium connexionem et ordinem. For the translation quoted here see McGrade et al., The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts. Volume 2: Ethics and Political Philosophy, 516. 23See Lagerlund, ‘Buridan's Theory of Free Choice and Its Influence’. 24In the tradition between Ockham and Descartes there are, of course, thinkers that recognize this problem and want to reintroduce final causes into nature. This is particularly visible among late Scholastic thinkers before Descartes. These are in turn the ones that he reacts against. 25It is often unclear in discussions of the history of the mind/body problem what the problem actually is or rather was. The reason for this is, I think, that the problem can be spelled out in different ways and also that there are in fact several mind/body problems. One problem is the so-called interaction problem, that is, how can such different things (or substances) as the mind and the body have an efficient causal effect on each other. Another problem is the unification problem, that is, how can the mind and the body, which can exist apart from each other, be united into one single thing: a human being. A third way of stating the problem has to do with the existence of sensations or sense ideas in the mind, which means that the problem is really how to explain in what way there can be sensations in a mind without a body. A fourth problem is the one I here have outlined. For an outline of the different problems see Shapiro, The Correspondence Between Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes and Lagerlund, ‘Introduction: The Mind/Body Problem and Late Medieval Conceptions of the Soul’. See also Lagerlund, ‘John Buridan and the Problem of Dualism in Early Fourteenth Century Philosophy’, for a discussion of the two first problems and see King, ‘Why Isn't the Mind-Body Problem Medieval?’ for a discussion of the third. 26I have presented versions of this paper at the final conference for the ESF Programme From Natural Philosophy to Science (2007) and at the National Congress of Philosophy in Umea, Sweden (2007). I am grateful to the organizers of these events for their invitations and I would also like to thank the participants that gave me valuable comments. I owe thanks to my two colleagues at Western, Benjamin Hill and Cory Dyck, for their comments on early drafts.

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