Bibliographic record
Abstract
INTRODUCTIONIn the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, there was a sense of general optimism that the end of the east-west struggle would open up new possibilities for dealing with international problems. There was talk of a peace dividend, of the spread of democracy, and of the prospect that together these would contribute to peace and development. Even in the early days of the post-Cold War period, however, there were indications that the surge of optimism was opposed by some hard realities. Writing in 1992, the secretary-general of the United Nations characterized the situation as follows:We have entered a time of global transition marked by uniquely contradictory trends. Regional and continental associations of States are evolving ways to deepen cooperation and ease some of the contentious characteristics of sovereign and nationalistic rivalries. National boundaries are blurred by advanced communications and global commerce, and by the decisions of States to yield some sovereign prerogatives to larger, common political associations. At the same time, however, fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty spring up, and the cohesion of States is threatened by brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife. Social peace is challenged on the one hand by new assertions of discrimination and exclusion and, on the other, by acts of terrorism seeking to undermine evolution and change through democratic means.1More than ten years later, those contradictory trends and the blurring of national boundaries continue to generate a sense of opportunity and threat, hope and crisis. For states, these trends challenge government and society in new and unexpected ways. This has particularly been the case for Canada. The effects of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and the attacks of 11 September 2001 have combined to prompt new thinking about national security and how to respond to such threats. These challenges, and their connection to the apparently accelerating interconnectedness of states, also raise questions about international responses.It is in that context that I was asked to explore the question of international or multilateral crisis response and emergency preparedness and whether Canada might play a role in advocating such an approach. This article proceeds in three sections. The first section explores the idea of crisis within the current international system. It discusses the idea of modern crises as a threat to the state and provides an overview of existing crisis response mechanisms within the United Nations system. Given that I focus on state-based responses, I have considered the United Nations, but not the role of NGOs or organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross. Similarly, I leave aside the whole question of international responses to humanitarian crises. Since the end of the Cold War, the nature and criteria for international responses to humanitarian crises has become an issue of considerable debate and study.2 While humanitarian crises are related to the issues discussed here, I have focused on a broader definition of crisis.The second section outlines the nature of the requirement for an international response to crisis management and discusses the advantages and disadvantages inherent in such an approach. The concluding section then addresses what form a Canadian effort might take and whether such an initiative is desirable.CRISIS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMInherent in the secretary-general's reference to blurred boundaries is an assumption about the interconnectedness of states and societies that has now become part and parcel of academic and policy thinking on security issues. While the extent, nature, and implications of various globalizing tendencies can be debated, few would argue that the phenomenon does not exist. The result is an outlook that sees events and crises as newly threatening in two ways. …
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.004 | 0.007 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.013 | 0.009 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.015 | 0.005 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.007 |
| Research integrity | 0.005 | 0.006 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.048 | 0.002 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".