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Price Ceilings on Milk Production Quota Values: Future or Folly?

2011· article· en· W2095208188 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.
fundA Canadian funder is recorded on the work.
venuePublished in a venue whose home country is Canada.
aboutThe title or abstract carries a Canadian signal from the geographic lexicon.

Bibliographic record

VenueCanadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d agroeconomie · 2011
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldAgricultural and Biological Sciences
TopicAgricultural Economics and Policy
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Guelph
FundersAgriculture and Agri-Food CanadaDairy Farmers of Ontario
KeywordsEconomicsRedistribution (election)Production (economics)Agricultural scienceDairy industryWelfareWelfare economicsMilk productionAgricultural economicsMicroeconomicsMarket economyPolitical science

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Since the inception of supply management in Canada during the 1970s, milk production quota has been used to regulate output and participation in the dairy industry. In recent years, milk quota values have increased dramatically, almost tripling in value since the mid 1980s. This led to the Dairy Farmers of Ontario intervening on the milk production quota exchange on two occasions: first, in November 2006 with a progressive transfer assessment and then in July 2009, replacing the former policy with a firm price ceiling—fixing the unit price of quota at $25,000. These policies represent a significant redistribution of economic benefits from milk producers selling their quota to those remaining in the industry. The objective of this study is to first explore the reasons for the increase in production quota values; and second, to assess the welfare and distributional effects of each of the two quota policy schemes. Our results suggest that the increase in quota values were driven by basic economic factors and that the efficiency losses from intervention in the quota exchange are nontrivial. We conclude by suggesting there are several alternative policy options that could minimize efficiency losses while moderating the escalation in quota values. Depuis la mise en place du système de gestion de l’offre au Canada dans les années 1970, les quotas laitiers sont utilisés pour régulariser la production et la participation dans l’industrie laitière. Au cours des dernières années, la valeur des quotas laitiers a fait un bond considérable et a pratiquement triplé depuis le milieu des années 1980. Cette situation a amené la Dairy Farmers of Ontario à intervenir à deux reprises dans le système d’échange de quotas laitiers : en novembre 2006, en imposant l’établissement d’un transfert progressif et en juillet 2009, en remplaçant la politique précédente par l’établissement d’un prix plafond ferme fixéà 25 000 $. Ces politiques permettent une importante redistribution des avantages économiques lorsque des producteurs de lait vendent leurs quotas à des producteurs qui demeurent dans le secteur. La présente étude visait d’abord à examiner les raisons qui sous‐tendent l’augmentation de la valeur des quotas de production et ensuite àévaluer le bien‐être et les effets distributifs de chaque plan de quotas. Les résultats de notre étude autorisent à penser que l’augmentation de la valeur des quotas a été motivée par des facteurs économiques fondamentaux et que les pertes d’efficacité découlant de l’intervention dans les échanges de quotas n’étaient pas sans importance. En conclusion, nous estimons qu’il existe plusieurs politiques de rechange qui pourraient minimiser les pertes d’efficacité tout en modérant l’escalade de la valeur des quotas.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.719
Threshold uncertainty score0.999

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0020.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.041
GPT teacher head0.168
Teacher spread0.127 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it