Bibliographic record
Abstract
This paper examines a monopoly firm’s decision on price and advertising in a market where exclusivity matters. Two forms of advertising are analyzed: (a) informative advertising, in which the firm provides real information about the product’s existence, features and quality, and (b) image advertising, in which the firm communicates an image for the product that allows buyers to associate themselves with. Consumers are both image-conscious and “snobbish. ” In other words, both image and exclusivity give them utility. Therefore, image advertis-ing increases consumers ’ willingness to pay even though they are assumed to be fully rational. In equilibrium only a fraction of consumers will buy the image good. We analyze the effects of income dispersion, the inherent nature of the product, and the existence of a strategic competitor on the equilibrium outcome and welfare. The monopolist makes lower profits selling to more snobbish con-sumers if the product is of high quality. An increase in consumers ’ snobbishness causes the share of image advertising to decrease if the product is of low quality. Also, it is shown that the monopolist advertises more than the two duopolists combined, and more consumers are served under monopoly than under duopoly, leading to an increase in total welfare.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.009 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.008 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".