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Fiscal Decentralization and Public Education Provision in China

2010· article· en· W2097510034 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

venuePublished in a venue whose home country is Canada.
no affNo Canadian affiliation: this work is invisible to an affiliation-only frame.
No Canadian affiliation. An affiliation-only frame, the usual design, would never have seen this work. It is one of the works that make the case for inverting the frame.

Bibliographic record

VenueCanadian social science · 2010
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicLocal Government Finance and Decentralization
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsDecentralizationChinaEconomicsExternalityPanel dataCentral governmentFiscal federalismRevenueFiscal unionFiscal imbalanceTax revenuePublic goodGovernment (linguistics)Local governmentPublic expenditureEconomic policyPublic economicsFiscal policyPublic financeFinanceMacroeconomicsMarket economyPolitical sciencePublic administration

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

After reform and opening up, China is experiencing rapid economic growth but inefficient public services provision. Public education expenditure-to-GDP ratio is too low to keep sustainable growth of China’s social and economic development. Some scholars believe that fiscal decentralization is an important reason. Firstly, this paper analyzes the main factors and path of how fiscal decentralization affects public education provision. While the 1994 tax-sharing reform raised the fiscal revenue of central government, it also increased the fiscal expenditure burden of local governments. Under local officials’ yard-stick competition regime, fiscal decentralization on expenditure may make local governments tend to allocate fiscal expenditure in infrastructure, to attract outside capital to develop local economy, but in the same time, reduce provision of public services, such as education, which has positive externalities. Then, empirical tests based on 1996-2007 prefectural jurisdications panel-data verifies that this phenomenon does exist in China. Further empirical tests make comparisons among different regions and we find that negative effect of fiscal decentralization on public education provision is the highest in Cenral and West China, and the lowest in Northeast China. At last, according to the analysis and empirical results, we give policy proposals on how to improve the public education provision in China.Key words: Fiscal Decentralization; Tax-Sharing Reform; Public Education Provision; Externalities; Panel Data

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.505
Threshold uncertainty score0.929

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.001
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.007
GPT teacher head0.271
Teacher spread0.264 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it