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Record W2099087692 · doi:10.22004/ag.econ.273661

Simultaneous Signaling in Elimination Contests

2008· preprint· en· W2099087692 on OpenAlexaff
Jun Zhang

Bibliographic record

VenueAgEcon Search (University of Minnesota, USA) · 2008
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Canadian institutionsQueen's University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsBiddingSignaling gameCONTESTBenchmark (surveying)Private information retrievalIncentiveMicroeconomicsEconomicsValuation (finance)Incentive compatibilityCheap talkMathematical economicsComputer scienceFinance

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

This paper analyzes the signaling effect of bidding in a two-round elimination contest. Before the final round, bids in the preliminary round are revealed and act as signals of the contestants’ private valuations. Depending on his valuation, a contestant may have an incentive to bluff or sandbag in the preliminary round in order to gain an advantage in the final round. I analyze this signaling effect and characterize the equilibrium in this game. Compared to the benchmark model, in which private valuations are revealed automatically before the final round and thus no signaling of bids takes place, I find that strong contestants bluff and weak contestants sandbag. In a separating equilibrium, bids in the preliminary round fully reveal the contestants’ private valuations. However, this signaling effect makes the equilibrium bidding strategy in the preliminary round steeper for high valuations and flatter for low valuations compared to the benchmark model.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.006
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.022
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.009
Threshold uncertainty score0.030

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0060.022
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0020.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.002
Scholarly communication0.0030.003
Open science0.0020.002
Research integrity0.0020.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0090.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.066
GPT teacher head0.321
Teacher spread0.255 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations6
Published2008
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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