MétaCan
Menu
Back to cohort
Record W2101482041

The Role of Middlemen inEfficient and Strongly Pairwise Stable Networks

2004· article· en· W2101482041 on OpenAlexaff
Robert P. Gilles, Subhadip Chakrabarti, Sudipta Sarangi, Narine Badasyan

Bibliographic record

VenueRePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 2004
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicGame Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsQueen's University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsPairwise comparisonStability (learning theory)Network formationIncentivePower (physics)Complex networkControl (management)Component (thermodynamics)Network structureMicroeconomicsComputer scienceEconomicsTheoretical computer scienceArtificial intelligencePhysics
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

We examine the strong pairwise stability concept in network formation theory under collective network benefits.Strong pairwise stability considers a pair of players to add a link through mutual consent while permitting them to unilaterally delete any subset of links under their control.We examine the properties of strongly pairwise stable networks and find that players in middleman positions, who have the power to break up the network into multiple components, play a critical role in such networks.We show that for the component-wise egalitarian rule there is no conflict between the efficient and stable networks when these middlemen have no incentive to break up the network. Finally, we examine efficiency and stability in middleman-free networks.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.006
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Other design · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.704
Threshold uncertainty score0.227

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0060.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.048
GPT teacher head0.349
Teacher spread0.301 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designOther design
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations5
Published2004
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

Explore more

Same venueRePEc: Research Papers in EconomicsSame topicGame Theory and ApplicationsFrench-language works237,207