What Prompts Health Care Policy Change? On Political Power Contests and Reform of Health Care Systems (The Case of Canada and Israel)
Bibliographic record
Abstract
This article attempts to shed light on the complexity inherent in health care reform policies in the context of political power contests that trigger the changes imposed on the health care system. Rather than being solely a response to financial circumstances, as it is often claimed, we argue that these political contests lead to many of the changes in the systems. Furthermore, changes do not necessarily occur when worrying symptoms appear in the system, but rather when the contest reaches a peak and when neither side involved can emerge from the contest as winner or loser and as defender of the public interest. While in both cases fiscal problems in the health systems are usually brought up in order to justify reform, the trigger for change in Israel has been the power contest between the two main parties--the Labor Party and the Likud Party--with the Likud attempting to impair the financial basis of the former. In Canada, the power contests are between the provinces and the federal government.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.010 | 0.013 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.023 | 0.044 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.019 | 0.005 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.005 |
| Research integrity | 0.011 | 0.007 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.006 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".